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DUELING CANONS
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR†
ABSTRACT
This Article offers the first targeted study of the Supreme Court’s
use of canons and other tools of statutory interpretation in a
“dueling” manner—that is, in both the majority and dissenting
opinions in the same case, to support opposing outcomes. Taking its
inspiration from Karl Llewellyn’s celebrated list of canons and
countercanons, this Article examines how often and in what ways the
members of the Roberts Court counter each other’s references to
particular interpretive tools when disagreeing about the proper
reading of a statute. Many of the Article’s findings are unexpected and
undermine the assumptions made by some of the most prominent
theories of statutory interpretation. Most notably, the data reveal that
several of textualism’s most-favored interpretive tools are at least as
susceptible to dueling use as the purposivist tools that textualists have
long denigrated as indeterminate and readily subject to judicial
manipulation. For example, the study shows that the Justices dueled
extensively over the meaning of statutory text. By contrast, they dueled
at far lower rates over legislative history, purpose, and intent.
Moreover, the Justices dueled over dictionary references, the whole
act rule, and language canons at rates that were virtually identical to
the rates at which they dueled over the purposivist-preferred tools.
The study also reveals that the canons do not seem capable of
constraining the Justices to vote against ideology and that noncanon
tools of analysis, including precedent and practical-consequences-
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based reasoning, lead to higher rates of dueling than do most
traditional canons or tools of statutory interpretation. After reporting
the data, the Article examines doctrinal patterns in how the Justices
duel over individual canons and explores the theoretical implications
of the Justices’ dueling canon use.
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INTRODUCTION
Judge A is an appellate-court judge tasked with interpreting a
criminal sentencing-enhancement statute. She believes that there is
1
a strong argument based on the expressio unius canon that the
enhancement provision does not apply to the defendant in the case.
Judge B, who is sitting on the panel with Judge A, believes that the
purpose of the sentencing statute covers conduct like the
defendant’s and that the enhancement therefore should apply.
Will Judge B write an opinion that relies on statutory purpose alone,
or will he search for an opposing language canon to counter Judge
A’s expressio unius argument? Will Judge A’s opinion confine itself
to discussing the expressio unius canon, or will it also seek to
demonstrate that her interpretation is consistent with the statute’s
purpose—perhaps framing that purpose in different terms than
Judge B’s opinion? How easy will it be for Judge A and Judge B to
find countervailing purpose or language canon arguments, if they
seek to counteract each other in this manner?

If we extrapolate from the above hypothetical, two larger
questions emerge: To what extent do judges tailor the interpretive
tools they discuss in statutory opinions to counter the tools referenced
by opposing opinions in those same cases? Or, put somewhat
differently, to what extent do various canons or tools of statutory
interpretation lend themselves to “dueling” use, such that they can be
employed to support competing statutory constructions? These are
two important, yet rarely asked, questions in statutory interpretation.
Both questions implicate some of the key theoretical debates in the
field—such as whether certain interpretive tools constrain judges
more than others—and both are deeply tied to underlying views
about the proper role of judges.
In 1950, Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn offered a
memorable answer to the second question, in what has been called
2
“one of the most celebrated law review articles of all time.” The
article famously challenged the view that the canons of statutory

1. The expressio unius canon is based on a Latin maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,” which dictates that the express inclusion of one item implies the exclusion of other
items not listed. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 852–54 (4th ed. 2007).
2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 593 (1992).
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construction provide neutral, predictable legal rules that lead courts
3
to one “correct” reading of a statute. Its most feted feature is a list of
twenty-eight pairs of canons and countercanons, which Llewellyn
labeled “thrusts” and “parries.” The article’s demonstration that the
canons readily can be used to cancel each other out has been taken to
demonstrate the canons’ illegitimacy and has served as a catalyst for
4
discussions about the ability of interpretive tools to constrain judges.
But to show that the canons (or other tools of construction) are
capable of being used by judges in a discretionary, canceling-out
manner is not to say that they will be used in such a manner.
Theoretical possibility is not the same as actual judicial practice.
This Article takes Llewellyn’s famous juxtaposition of canons
and countercanons as its inspiration and examines the extent to which
the modern Supreme Court actually duels over the most common
statutory interpretation canons and tools in opposing opinions in the
same case. That is, the Article identifies the extent to which a
majority (or occasionally, concurring) opinion’s reference to a
particular canon or tool is countered by a dissenting opinion’s
offsetting reference to the same canon or tool, in the same case.
Notably, the Article measures a different kind of judicial dueling over
interpretive canons and tools than that suggested by Llewellyn’s
“thrusts” and “parries”: the Article counts as dueling those instances
in which a majority and dissenting opinion in a case invoke the same
interpretive tool to reach different readings of the statute. It does not
measure instances in which a majority opinion invokes one tool (e.g.,
purpose) and the dissenting opinion counters by relying on another
tool (e.g., text or a language canon). The reasons for this
methodological choice are elaborated in Part II.A.
3. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, And Canons In Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679–80 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 547–48
(1992); John F. Manning, Continuity and Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863,
1863–64 (2004); John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d
283, 283 (2001) (“Llewellyn largely persuaded two generations of academics that the canons of
construction were not to be taken seriously.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805–14 (1983); David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992) (noting
that the canons have been “interred” by Llewellyn’s essay); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 452 (1989). But see Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (“Llewellyn’s
critique of the maxims appears overstated.”).
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Despite the Llewellyn article’s tremendous influence on
statutory interpretation scholars, only two empirical studies to date
have considered, even in passing, the extent to which majority and
dissenting opinions rely on the same interpretive canons to counter
5
each other’s constructions of the same statute. One of the studies was
limited to employment law and only briefly discussed dueling
6
references to language and substantive canons. The other focused
exclusively on the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history and paid
7
only passing attention to judicial dueling over this tool. No study has
examined whether, or to what extent, the Court uses the canons in a
dueling manner when construing statutes dealing with subjects other
than employment law. And, importantly, no study to date has
compared the extent to which the Court uses other traditional
statutory interpretation tools such as purpose, dictionaries, the
common law, and the like in a dueling fashion, period. This Article
offers the first empirical evidence of this kind, going beyond the
8
linguistic and referential canons contained in Llewellyn’s list, and
also exploring the extent to which majority and dissenting opinions
9
duel over the full array of other statutory interpretation tools.
Thus far, statutory interpretation theory has operated with a
blind spot regarding the extent to which particular interpretive tools
and canons are used to support competing statutory constructions in
the same case. Scholars and jurists have made assumptions about how
manipulable they think certain interpretive tools are, but no one has
tested those assumptions systematically or examined how judges use

5. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Canons
of Construction]; David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2010). Both of these studies
measured judicial dueling by counting instances in which a majority opinion’s reference to a
particular interpretive resource (e.g., a language canon or legislative history) was countered by a
dissenting opinion’s reference to the same interpretive resource. That is, both of these studies
defined “dueling” the same way that this Article does—rather than counting how often the
majority opinion in a case invoked one interpretive tool (a “thrust”) while the dissenting
opinion countered with a different canon or tool (the “parry”), as suggested by Llewellyn’s
famous list.
6. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 65 tbl.XII, 68 & n.222,
96–102.
7. Law & Zaring, supra note 5, at 1736–38, 1739 tbl.9.
8. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 595 & nn.2–3 (characterizing “Thrust But
Parry” numbers 2–6, 8–10, and 13–14 as referential canons and numbers 11–12 and 15–28 as
linguistic canons).
9. For a detailed explanation of this Article’s methodology, see infra Part II.A.
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interpretive tools to counter each other in practice. This Article
begins to address that lacuna.
The Article’s findings are surprising, and intriguing, for statutory
interpretation theory. Five points stand out: (1) the overall rate of
dueling canon or interpretive tool use in the Roberts Court’s first five
10
terms was low—at or below 25.0 percent for most tools; (2) the rates
of dueling for text/plain meaning and precedent were much higher
11
than for other tools, at 42.7 percent and 63.3 percent, respectively;
(3) the rate of judicial dueling over most textualist-preferred
interpretive tools was roughly the same (about 25.0 percent) as the
12
rate of judicial dueling over purposivist-preferred interpretive tools;
(4) statutes dealing with certain subject areas—criminal law,
environmental law, and antidiscrimination law—showed particularly
13
high rates of dueling; and (5) none of the canons or tools seemed
capable of constraining the Justices’ tendency to vote consistently
14
with their ideological preferences, at least in divided-vote cases.
These empirical findings have important implications for some of
the key debates in statutory interpretation. They are particularly
relevant to theoretical approaches that emphasize predictability or
seek to constrain judicial discretion. For example, the findings call
into question some of textualism’s (and in particular Justice Scalia’s)
claims about the unique manipulability of interpretive tools like
purpose, intent, and legislative history as compared to text, language
15
canons, dictionary references, and “other statutes.” The findings also
cast some doubt on purposivism’s claims that reliance on legislative
history, relative to other interpretive resources, helps courts act as
16
faithful agents of the legislature. The findings even have implications
10. See infra Table 1; discussion infra Part II.B.1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra Table 3a; discussion infra Part II.B.2. Of the eighty-eight cases in the dataset
that contained judicial dueling over one or more statutory interpretation-specific tools, 26.1
percent involved a criminal statute, 13.6 percent involved an antidiscrimination statute, and 6.8
percent involved an environmental statute.
14. See infra Part II.B.3; Tables 6a–6g, 8. In the subset of cases decided unanimously, by
contrast, some of the interpretive tools consistently correlated with votes against individual
Justices’ ideology. See infra notes 127–36; Table 7.
15. “Other statutes” is an interpretive tool that directs interpreters to compare how courts
in previous cases have interpreted identical or similar language in other statutes addressing
issues similar to the statute at issue. See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 871 (2012).
16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1548–49 (1998); John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005).
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for pragmatism—a theoretical approach that does not claim to
promote predictability or constrain judges—because the data confirm
that practical consequences play a significant role in the judicial
interpretation of statutes, and because they show that judges duel
along predictable lines with respect to this interpretive tool.
Specifically, the data reveal that most of the Court’s dueling over
practical consequences involves one opinion that emphasizes
administrability-type practical concerns and an opposing opinion that
17
emphasizes policy-constancy concerns.
The Article also engages in doctrinal analysis of how precisely
majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same interpretive
resource to reach different readings of a statute. This analysis reveals
some noteworthy patterns in the Court’s dueling over particular
canons. For example, in applying the plain meaning rule, the Justices
often divide over the prototypical, core meaning versus the legalist
18
meaning of key statutory text. Similarly, when dueling over a
statute’s purpose, the Justices who favor one reading of the statute
sometimes focus on a generalized purpose, while those who favor an
opposing reading focus on a narrower, more specific purpose. These
patterns provide valuable insights and add texture to our
understanding of how the Court applies the tools of statutory
construction. The patterns also suggest that it may be possible to
eliminate some of the dueling that occurs over certain interpretive
tools—through clearer meta-rules about how those tools should be
19
applied.

17. See infra Part III.A.4. This administrability versus policy-constancy divide is one that I
describe in earlier empirical work regarding the Roberts Court. See Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 244–45 (2010). Briefly, administrability concerns focus on an interpretation’s
effect on judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing the interpretation, or the clarity and
predictability of the rule the interpretation creates. Policy-constancy concerns focus on whether
an interpretation ensures consistent application of the statute over time, any arbitrariness
created by the interpretation, or the justness of the interpretation.
18. See Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 997, 1002
(2011); Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2027–28,
2060–61 (2005). The prototypical meaning of a statute focuses on the “core example” that the
statute was designed to reach, whereas the legalist meaning looks broadly to the conceptual
extension of the word at issue, often incorporating the specialized connotations and conventions
the legal world has attached to the word. See Nourse, supra, at 1000–03. The differences
between prototypical and legalist meaning are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.A.1.
19. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1822–23
(2010) (describing state courts’ adoption of a binding statutory interpretation methodology and
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the
theoretical and empirical background for this study. Part II reports
the study’s findings on the Roberts Court’s dueling use of interpretive
canons and other tools from the middle of the 2005 term, when
Justice Alito joined the Court, to the end of the Court’s 2010 term. It
also provides doctrinal analysis of the Court’s dueling over several
individual interpretive tools. Part III explores the theoretical
implications of the data and doctrinal observations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Llewellyn’s “Thrusts” and “Parries”
20

Ironically, Llewellyn’s “fiendishly deconstructive” attack on the
canons—the famous list of “Thrust But Parries”—was not the focus
of his article. Indeed, Llewellyn included the list only at the end of the
21
article, as an illustrative exercise. His focus, instead, was on the
broader legal-realist claim that judges do not decide cases based on
neutral legal rules, and that neutral legal rules capable of producing a
single correct answer do not in fact exist. Llewellyn had made this
point earlier in the common-law context, arguing that case law
precedents are highly malleable and subject to multiple, conflicting
22
applications. His article was designed to show that the same is true
in the statutory interpretation context, despite the existence of
23
numerous seemingly definitive “canons of construction.”
One reason why Llewellyn’s list of “thrusts” and “parries” has
endured, and proved so influential among academics, is because the
list seems to demonstrate concretely that the canons are easily
manipulated and, therefore, incapable of constraining judges.
Llewellyn did not actually argue that courts would use his canon–
countercanon pairs to reach opposing statutory constructions in the
same case, but the strong implication was that judges looking to

suggesting that federal courts might benefit from adopting some form of methodological stare
decisis as well).
20. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process,
35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983).
21. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 401.
22. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 74 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, A Realist
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 443–44 (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1241–42 (1931).
23. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 399 (“What we need to see now is that all of this is
paralleled, in regard to statutes.”).
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counter a statutory reading based on one canon could readily find an
opposing canon to support their preferred outcome. Indeed,
Llewellyn called it a “foolish pretense” for courts to justify their
statutory constructions based on “a set of mutually contradictory . . .
24
rules on How to Construe a Statute.”
If Llewellyn was correct that judges can readily find
countercanons for every canon and that judges use the canons as
after-the-fact justifications for their decisions, then we might expect,
in practice, to see judicial opinions pitting canon against canon to
neutralize the tools that supposedly support an opposing reading—at
least in cases where judges disagree about the best reading of the
statute. For example, we might expect to see dictionary definitions in
a majority opinion countered by opposing dictionary definitions in
the dissenting opinion, references to statutory purpose in a majority
opinion (e.g., “the Civil Rights Act was enacted in order to remedy
the nation’s long history of discrimination against racial minorities”)
countered by an opposing statutory purpose in the dissenting opinion
(e.g., “the Civil Rights Act’s primary goal was to create a color-blind
society”), and a majority opinion’s reliance on the whole act rule met
by reliance on a contradictory subset of the whole act rule in the
25
dissenting opinion. Although this Article does not measure the
Court’s use of Llewellyn’s precise form of canon-for-countercanon
pairings, it takes his canons-can-point-in-different-directions heuristic
as inspiration for examining how often majority and dissenting
opinions in the same case use the same canon to support different
statutory constructions.
In a less-celebrated passage of his article, Llewellyn also
embraced a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. He
argued that “if a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light
26
of some assumed purpose.” Llewellyn did not claim that judicial
reliance on statutory purpose would be more determinate than
reliance on the canons, but his simultaneous rejection of the canons
and endorsement of statutory purpose raises the comparison. This is
particularly so given that the New Textualism popularized by Justice
Scalia takes precisely the opposite view—hailing the canons as
24. Id.
25. See id. at 404 (describing “Thrust But Parry” number 17, which says “The same
language used repeatedly in the same connection is presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout the statute” versus “This presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary to
assign different meanings to make the statute consistent”).
26. Id. at 400.
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neutral rules that enhance predictability, while arguing that statutory
purpose is malleable and easily shaped to justify an individual judge’s
27
policy preferences. Indeed, both Llewellyn’s list and New
Textualism’s claims about the relative merits of different interpretive
tools invite empirical analysis of the extent to which statutory
purpose—as well as other noncanon tools, like legislative history—
are susceptible to Llewellyn’s “thrust and parry” criticism.
Part II of this Article answers these questions with data from the
Roberts Court’s first five terms. Before turning to the data, however,
the next Section reviews the two empirical studies that have
addressed judicial dueling over the canons of construction and
legislative history, respectively.
B. Prior Empirical Work
As noted above, only two studies to date have attempted to
measure the extent to which judges use the canons of construction
against each other to support opposing readings of the same statute in
the same case. The first study, conducted by James Brudney and
Corey Ditslear, reviewed the Supreme Court’s use of interpretive
28
canons in every workplace-law case decided between 1969 and 2003.
The study focused on the extent to which the canons of construction
operate as neutral legal rules, constraining the Justices’ ability to
interpret statutes according to their ideological preferences. Brudney
and Ditslear treated “dueling canons” in passing, as a way to test
claims that the canons enhance consistency and predictability and
29
perform an important “gap-filling” function. They made two
findings that seem to support Llewellyn’s skeptical view of the
canons: (1) dissenting Justices were significantly more likely to rely
on language and substantive canons when language canons were part

27. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
(1997); sources cited infra note 186.
28. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 15–69. The Brudney–
Ditslear study coded for judicial reliance on two categories of interpretive tools: language
canons, which the study defined to include grammar rules, Latin maxims, the whole act rule, and
the in pari materia rule, and substantive canons, defined as judicial presumptions based on
constitutional and common-law norms about how statutes should be interpreted. Id. at 12–13.
29. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 147, 151–53 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (“One goal . . . of the
canons, is to lower the costs of drafting statutes. . . . The Court can perform a valuable
coordinating function by generating ‘off-the-rack,’ gap-filling rules that are accessible ex ante to
the drafters.”); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 943.
THE LAW 25–27
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of the majority’s reasoning than when they were not; and (2) the
canons failed to constrain the Justices’ ideological preferences, as
conservative Justices tended to use the canons to reach conservative
results, while liberal Justices tended to use the canons to reach liberal
30
outcomes. Based on these findings, the authors concluded that, “in
divided decisions, the Justices themselves are more prone to view the
31
canons as reasonably amenable to supporting either side.”
In a subsequent article expanding on their original study,
Brudney and Ditslear found some evidence that judicial reliance on
legislative history does have a constraining effect on judicial ideology.
Specifically, they reported that liberal Justices were more likely to
vote in favor of employer interests when they invoked legislative
32
history, and that, during the Burger Court, conservative Justices
were more likely to vote in favor of worker interests when they relied
33
on legislative history. However, Brudney and Ditslear found that
after 1986, conservative Justices ruled increasingly in favor of
employers (consistent with their ideological preferences), relying on
34
canons and even legislative history to do so. Brudney and Ditslear
also reported what they called a “Scalia Effect,” finding that liberal
Justices opted not to rely on legislative history in a series of
proemployer majority opinions that Justice Scalia joined, and that
when liberal Justices did rely on legislative history, Justice Scalia was
significantly less likely to join their majority opinions, even when he
35
voted for the same result. Conversely, the authors found that Justice
Scalia’s resistance to legislative history did not extend to majority
opinions authored by his conservative colleagues; that is, he was just
as likely to join his conservative colleagues’ majority opinions when
36
they relied on legislative history as when they did not.
These findings are significant, particularly given the large sample
size of workplace-law cases examined by Brudney and Ditslear. But
the findings also are limited in their generalizability because, as
Brudney and Ditslear acknowledged, their study examined cases in
30. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57–60.
31. Id. at 98.
32. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 143–44 &
tbl.6 (2008) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History].
33. Id. at 144 tbl.6.
34. Id. at 142–44; Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 6.
35. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 160–69.
36. Id. at 169–70.
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only one subject area—workplace law. It is thus unclear whether the
significant level of dueling that Brudney and Ditslear found over
language and substantive canons is representative of how the Justices
use the canons in all statutory interpretation cases. Moreover,
Brudney and Ditslear, like Llewellyn, focused exclusively on language
and substantive canons. But there are many other interpretive tools
that courts regularly use to construe statutes—including the plain
meaning rule, purpose, legislative history, dictionary definitions, and
congressional intent. And there are non-statute-specific tools of legal
analysis, such as precedent and practical consequences, which recent
empirical work has shown to play a significant role in the judicial
38
interpretation of statutes. The Brudney–Ditslear study thus provides
an incomplete picture of how the Court duels over statutory
interpretation tools other than language and substantive canons,
leaving open the questions of how susceptible other tools are to
competing inferences and whether such tools provide any
constraining effect on judges’ ability to vote according to their
ideological preferences.
The second empirical study to date on judicial dueling is David
Law and David Zaring’s comprehensive study of the Supreme Court’s
39
use of legislative history. Law and Zaring studied every Supreme
Court statutory interpretation case decided from 1953 to 2006. Their
focus was on identifying legal factors that might influence the Court
40
to rely on legislative history, such as the age or length of a statute.
Like Brudney and Ditslear, they examined judicial dueling over
legislative history only in passing, as a small part of their larger
41
project about legislative history use. And, like Brudney and Ditslear,
Law and Zaring found that dissenting Justices were significantly more

37. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 26–27.
38. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1, 5, 12, 18, 21 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1107–08 (1992); see also
Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 236–37 & tbl.1 (reporting that practical consequences were the
third most frequently cited interpretive resource cited by the Roberts Court during its first
three-and-a-half terms, showing up in 51.8 percent of all statutory cases decided during that time
period).
39. Law & Zaring, supra note 5.
40. Additional variables for which Law and Zaring coded were the complexity and
obscurity of the statute, as well as the number of times the statute was amended. See id. at 1689–
98.
41. See id. at 1738.
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likely to cite legislative history when a majority or concurring opinion
also cited legislative history than when no other opinion cited this
42
interpretive resource. Law and Zaring hypothesized that these data
“suggest that Justices are sensitive to the types of arguments made by
their colleagues and feel an obligation or desire to respond in kind,
43
especially when they disagree with one another on the merits.”
Law and Zaring’s findings, like Brudney and Ditslear’s, are
important, especially given the depth and breadth of their sample
size—all cases before the Court that involved statutes over a fiftyyear period. Their study was not limited by subject area, so their
findings are less likely to be distorted by partisanship, judicial
impressions of congressional expertise, age of a statute, obscurity, or
other concerns that might be particular to one area of the law. But
Law and Zaring examined judicial dueling over only one interpretive
tool—legislative history—shedding no light on competing judicial
invocations of the numerous other canons and tools of statutory
construction. Thus their study, too, only scratches the surface in
exploring how Justices authoring an opinion respond to interpretive
canons and tools used by an opposing opinion.
The next Part seeks to provide a more complete picture of the
Justices’ dueling over multiple interpretive tools as well as to explore
doctrinally how the Justices engage each other’s use of particular
interpretive tools.
II. FINDINGS
A. Methodology
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on
empirical and doctrinal analysis of all decisions in the Roberts Court’s
44
2005 (post-January 31, 2006) through 2010 terms that confronted a
question of statutory interpretation. Every case decided during that
period was examined through the Supreme Court’s online database to
45
determine whether it dealt with a statutory issue. Any case in which

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. This is the date that Justice Alito joined the Court. Biographies of Current Justices of
the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx [http://perma.cc/8HLT-QVKN].
45. See Opinions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/
opinions.aspx [http://perma.cc/P5SJ-ENZP]. The Court’s online database currently only goes
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the Court’s opinion contained a discussion about statutory meaning
was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules of
46
Civil Procedure were not included, but a handful of constitutional
cases in which the Court construed the meaning of a federal statute
47
before deciding the constitutional question were included. This
selection methodology yielded 255 statutory cases over five-and-ahalf terms, with 255 majority or plurality opinions, 103 concurring
opinions, 156 dissenting opinions, 12 part-concurring/part-dissenting
opinions, and 2 part-majority/part-concurring opinions, for a total of
48
528 opinions. Of these, 115 cases were decided unanimously, and 140
were decided by a divided vote.
In coding and analyzing these cases, my primary goal was to
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced a range of
interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal statutes. The
cases in the study were examined for references to the following
interpretive tools: (1) statutory text, including appeals to plain
meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) grammar rules; (4) the whole
act rule; (5) other federal and state statutes; (6) common-law
precedent; (7) substantive canons; (8) Supreme Court precedent; (9)
statutory purpose; (10) practical consequences; (11) legislative intent;
(12) legislative history; and (13) language canons such as noscitur a
49
sociis and expressio unius.
These interpretive sources are consistent with those examined in
other empirical studies of the Court’s statutory interpretation
back to the 2009 Term, id., but when I began coding cases in 2007, it went back to the 2005
Term.
46. I made this judgment call because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are
created in a manner that differs significantly from federal statutes—they are drafted by judges
rather than Congress and do not require the President’s approval. Accordingly, several of the
interpretive tools available when construing statutes either are not available with respect to the
FRCP or provide a very different kind of context, from a very different perspective, when used
to construe the FRCP—e.g., legislative history, intent, the whole act rule, and other statutes.
47. In such cases, the opinion was coded as unanimous, close margin, or wide margin based
on the Justices’ votes regarding the statutory interpretation question only; thus, if the Justices
agreed unanimously that the statute should be read to mean X, but then split regarding the
constitutional validity of the statute, the opinion was coded as unanimous. See, e.g., Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009).
48. For a list of the cases examined in the study, see infra Appendix.
49. In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I and at least one research assistant
separately read and analyzed each opinion and separately recorded the use of each interpretive
resource. In the event of a disagreement, I reviewed and reconsidered the case and made the
final determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded. For a detailed
explanation of how the cases were coded, see Krishnakumar, supra note 17, Codebook at 291–
96.
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50

practices. A few differences in definitions used for the different
sources were inevitable and will be pointed out where notable. For
example, unlike the Brudney and Ditslear study, which grouped
together several interpretive tools under the heading “language
canons,” I counted separately references to grammar canons,
51
language canons, and the whole act rule. However, in order to allow
comparison with Brudney and Ditslear’s data, I also created a
combined variable that coded for reliance on any one of these
interpretive resources (so that if an opinion referenced at least one of
these interpretive sources, it was coded as a “yes”). Further, unlike
52
some previous studies, I recorded as a reference to “practical
consequences” any reliance on the absurdity of a result, the
administrative or other burdens caused by an interpretation, the
fairness of an interpretation, an interpretation’s coherence or
incoherence, the workability of an interpretation for lower courts, or
other effects that an interpretation could be expected to produce. I
also further disaggregated this interpretive tool, coding for
administrability-type practical consequences concerns versus policy53
constancy-type practical consequences concerns.
In recording the Court’s reliance on the above interpretive tools,
I counted only references that reflected substantive reliance on the
tool in reaching an interpretation. Opinions that mentioned a
particular interpretive tool but rejected the tool as unconvincing were

50. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 38, at 11–12; Zeppos, supra note 38, at 1089; see generally
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009)
(surveying the tools of statutory interpretation and presenting empirical findings on the
Rehnquist Court's use of interpretive tools).
51. The term “grammar canons” refers to interpretive maxims that are based on basic
conventions of grammar and syntax, such as “‘[o]r’ means in the alternative” or “[s]hall’ is
mandatory, while ‘may’ is precatory.” See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 856–60. The term
“language canons” refers to canons that are based on Latin maxims, such as “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius” (the inclusion of one item implies the exclusion of others not listed) or
“noscitur a sociis” (terms in a statutory list should be interpreted in light of the other items in
the list). See id. at 852–54. The whole act rule refers to a series of inferences that courts may
draw about the meaning of one section of a statute based on how other sections of the statute
are structured; it includes the rule that differences in similar or parallel statutory provisions
should be deemed deliberate and intentional (the meaningful variation rule), rules dictating that
the title and preamble of a statute are relevant but not dispositive in determining statutory
meaning, and the rule that one section of a statute should not be construed in a manner that
renders another section superfluous (the rule against superfluity). See id. at 862–65.
52. See infra Part III.A.4.
53. See id.; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 17, Codebook at 294 (explaining parameters
for coding for references to administrability-type practical consequences versus policyconstancy-type practical consequences).
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not counted. Similarly, I did not count instances in which the Court
merely acknowledged, but did not accept, a litigant’s argument that a
54
particular canon or tool dictated a particular result.
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive tool
were counted. That is, when the Court relied primarily on one
interpretive tool but went on to note that x, y, and z tools further
supported that interpretation, the references to x, y, and z were coded
55
along with the primarily relied-upon source(s).
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and each
case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin, or wide
56
margin (cases with six or more Justices in the majority). Each
Justice’s vote in each case also was recorded, as was the author of
each opinion. This methodology comports with my previous empirical
57
study.

54. An example may help illustrate. In Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010), the majority
opinion relied on the plain meaning rule, statutory purpose, and practical consequences to
conclude that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in a statute allowing good time credit for good
behavior by prisoners applies to the time actually served by the prisoner, rather than the time
the prisoner was sentenced to serve. Id. at 479–84. In so ruling, the majority rejected a legislative
history argument advanced by petitioner, finding that the cited portions of the legislative record
did not address the precise interpretive question at issue. See id. at 485. It also rejected rule of
lenity and whole act rule arguments relied on by petitioner and the dissent, stating that the rule
of lenity was inapplicable because the statute was not ambiguous and that interpreting “term of
imprisonment” consistently throughout the statute would contradict the statute’s text (a texttrumps-whole-act-rule argument). Id. at 486–89. The opinion was coded for reliance on
text/plain meaning, purpose, and practical consequences, but not legislative history, substantive
canons, or the whole act rule.
55. For example, in Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770 (2010), the Court held that when a
bankruptcy debtor underestimates the value of “property claimed as exempt” on her Schedule
C filing, the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to retain in the estate any actual value above that
listed, even if he did not initially object to the “property claimed as exempt.” Id. at 774. The
majority opinion relied primarily on the “clear” meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s text,
combined with a whole act argument. Id. at 782. The opinion also noted that this interpretation
was consistent with the historical treatment of bankruptcy exemptions (common-law
precedent), disagreed with the majority’s reading of Supreme Court precedent, and cited other
Supreme Court precedent supporting its interpretation. Id. at 786–91. The opinion was coded
for references to text/plain meaning, the whole act rule, common law, and Supreme Court
precedent.
56. Cases decided by a vote margin of 5–4, 5–3 (with only eight justices participating), 5–2
(with only seven justices participating), and 4–1–4 (by a plurality) were coded as “close margin”
cases. If the vote margin was 6–3, either with six justices in the majority or with only five justices
in the majority and one concurring and three dissenting, the case was coded as a wide margin
case. A quick perusal of the full dataset (not just dueling canon cases) reveals only six cases like
this (6–3 with five in the majority plus one concurring).
57. See Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 231–33.
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To measure the Court’s use of interpretive canons and tools in a
dueling fashion, I sorted the cases in the dataset by docket number
and identified those that showed a majority and dissenting opinion
(or a concurring and dissenting opinion) referencing the same canon
or tool. For these purposes, I defined “same canon or tool” to mean
that both the majority and dissent argued that a specific interpretive
resource—purpose, dictionary definition, substantive canon—
supported their respective readings of the statute. I did not count as
“dueling canon” cases those in which the dissenting opinion
mentioned, or even criticized, the majority’s application of a
particular canon or tool, unless the dissenting opinion also argued
58
that the interpretive tool supported its reading of the statute. I made
this methodological choice because in my view, judicial rejections or
disagreements over whether an interpretive canon applies in a
particular case do not constitute disagreements over the meaning
dictated by the canon. Rather, such disagreements show merely that
the canon has limitations or exceptions and that the opposing opinion
author found the argument from the canon powerful enough to
require criticism. Further, while battles over applicability do provide
some evidence that a canon does not constrain judges—who retain
the discretion to refuse to apply the canon in a particular case—they
do not show that the canon itself is malleable or indeterminate. That
is, disagreements over applicability do not necessarily reflect an
underlying looseness as to what construction the canon, if applicable,
directs the Court to adopt or the canon’s ready susceptibility to
judicial massaging to support a judge’s chosen construction. Thus,
counting such disagreements as instances of “dueling canon” use
would be misleading, measuring something other than how often the

58. For example, in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010), the Court held that a
district court retained the power to order restitution to crime victims—even though the court
missed the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act’s 90-day deadline for establishing the amount of
the victim’s losses—because the court had made clear, prior to the deadline, that it would order
restitution in some amount. Id. at 608. The majority opinion referenced several interpretive
tools, including the statute’s purpose of helping victims by imposing restitution on convicts. Id.
at 613–14. The dissenting opinion argued that the statute’s text did not permit such a reading,
particularly given other criminal statutes that “only make[] sense against a background rule that
trial courts cannot change sentences at will.” Id. at 625–28 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent rejected the majority’s purpose argument, reasoning that the statute’s broad purpose did
not justify a reading that contradicts the statutory text. See id. at 625. The dissenting opinion was
coded for references to text/plain meaning and other statutes, but not statutory purpose.
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Justices used particular interpretive tools to support opposing
59
statutory readings.
I also did not count as “dueling canon” cases those in which a
majority opinion relied on one interpretive canon, such as the whole
act rule, while the dissenting opinion relied on another interpretive
60
canon or tool, such as statutory purpose or a dictionary definition.
On the one hand, a high rate of this kind of interpretive resource
dueling would provide some evidence that the interpretive canons
and tools do not constrain judges by showing that judges retain
significant discretion about which canons to apply, and which ones to
privilege when different canons point in different directions. But
measuring this type of dueling would not reveal very much about the
indeterminacy of individual interpretive tools or show how often the
Justices counter each other’s references to specific interpretive
resources. Instead, it would demonstrate only, or at least primarily,
that there is no settled methodology dictating which interpretive
canons and tools judges should use to construe statutes, and no
hierarchy indicating the order in which they should prioritize
particular tools when different tools point toward different
constructions. The whole act rule is not necessarily indeterminate
simply because statutory purpose points toward a different
interpretation; and the entire practice of consulting canons and tools
of statutory construction is not meaningless simply because judges
faced with different tools pointing in different directions disagree
61
about which tools to privilege. Accordingly, in order to provide a
better picture of individual canons’ malleability, this study counted as
dueling only those cases in which a majority opinion’s reliance on
purpose was countered with a dissenting opinion’s reliance on
purpose, or a majority opinion’s reference to a dictionary definition
was countered with a dissenting opinion’s reference to a dictionary
definition, or a substantive canon reference in a majority opinion was
countered with a substantive canon reference in a dissenting opinion,
and so on.

59. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 27 (arguing that Llewellyn’s “parries” do not contradict
the corresponding canon but merely show that it is not absolute).
60. In this sense, my definition of “dueling” interpretive tool use departs from Llewellyn’s,
as Llewellyn’s thrusts and parries certainly include opposing pairs of this kind.
61. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 27 (“Every canon is simply one indication of
meaning; and if there are more contrary indications (perhaps supported by other canons), it
must yield. But that does not render the entire enterprise a fraud . . . .”).
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B. Dueling Statistics
Before reporting the data, it is important to note some
limitations of this study. First, the study covers only five-and-a-half
Supreme Court terms and only 255 statutory interpretation cases,
decided by some combination of the same eleven Justices. While this
dataset is large enough to teach us some things about the Court’s use
of canons and interpretive tools in a dueling manner, the data
reported may reflect trends specific to the Roberts Court. Second,
although the number of cases reviewed is large enough to provide
some valuable insights, the focus should be on the patterns that
emerge rather than on precise differences in the percentages
reported. Third, in noting the canons and other interpretive tools
referenced in majority and dissenting opinions, I make no claims to
have discovered the Justices’ underlying or “true” motivations for
deciding statutory cases; the data do not reveal whether a particular
opinion relied on a tool because the opinion’s author was persuaded
by that interpretive tool, or merely because the author felt it
necessary to counter an opposing opinion’s reliance on that tool. The
study’s empirical and doctrinal claims are confined to describing how
the Justices publicly justify their statutory constructions, and to
theorizing about discernable patterns in the kinds of public
justifications the Justices regularly provide.
1. Frequency of Dueling. At the outset of this study, I expected
to find higher rates of judicial dueling over dictionary definitions,
legislative history, and statutory purpose and lower, but still high,
rates of dueling over language canons and substantive canons.
Specifically, because dictionaries contain multiple definitions for each
word—and because the Justices have multiple dictionaries to choose
from—I expected to find the Justices countering each other’s
dictionary references in the vast majority of cases—i.e., in the vicinity
of 60 percent to 70 percent of the cases. I expected to find similarly
high rates of judicial dueling over legislative history because
resourceful lawyers can be expected to dig through the (often
copious) legislative history of a statute and find some snippet to
support their clients’ preferred statutory construction. Further,
because both proponents and opponents of a proposed law often
make competing statements on the House and Senate floor about the
likely effects or scope of the bill, there is a wealth of material for the
Justices to invoke in support of opposing readings of a statute. With
respect to statutory purpose, I expected to find high rates of judicial
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dueling because statutes often have multiple purposes, again
providing the Justices with ample fodder for fashioning an argument
that their chosen statutory construction is more consistent with a
statute’s purpose than is the opposing opinion’s.
For substantive canons, I expected to find lower, but still
meaningful rates of judicial dueling (perhaps in the range of 30
percent to 40 percent). This expectation stemmed from the fact that
substantive canons are judicially created policy norms, so they should
prove relatively easy for the Justices to craft anew, or to tweak and
invoke in order to lend an aura of inevitability and consistency with
larger legal norms to their chosen interpretation. I similarly expected
to find noteworthy rates of judicial dueling (perhaps in the 30 percent
range) over language canons. This expectation was based on the fact
that it is often possible to characterize the common denominator
connecting statutory terms in different and competing ways, so as to
support competing noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis arguments
about what a term in a list means. I also expected the rates of dueling
over text/plain meaning to be lower than the rates of dueling over
legislative history, purpose, and dictionary definitions. For the other
canons and interpretive tools, I did not have specific expectations
about how often the Justices would employ them in a dueling manner.
Table 1 lists the frequency with which the Justices on the Roberts
Court employed the various canons and tools of statutory
construction in a dueling fashion—that is, in both the majority and
dissenting opinions in the same case—in the 255 cases decided and
the 528 opinions issued from the time Justice Alito joined the Court
62
in 2006 through the end of the Court’s 2010 term. For each
interpretive tool, the Table first reports the number of unanimous
opinions, majority opinions, and dissenting opinions that referenced
the tool. It then reports the percentage of cases in which a majority
and dissenting opinion in the same case both referenced the
interpretive tool. This figure is calculated using as a denominator the
total number of divided-vote cases in which the interpretive tool was
invoked by at least one opinion (second-to-last-column) and,
separately, using as a denominator the number of all cases—including
unanimous cases—in which at least one opinion referenced the tool
63
(last column).
62. See infra Table 1.
63. Table 1 uses the number of cases in which at least one opinion relied on an interpretive
tool, rather than the total number of cases reviewed in the study (255) as a denominator because
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Table 1: Dueling Canon Use 2005–2010 Terms
Dueling

Percent

Opinions

Dueling In

Percent

Unanimous

Majority

Dissenting

(Majority or

Divided-

Dueling

Cases

Opinions

Opinions

Concurrence

Vote

In All

(n=115)*

(n=255)

(n=155)

+ Dissent)†

Cases‡

Cases˚

Supreme Court
Precedent

63.7%

32.6%

69

157

75

58

(n=91)

(n=178)

Text or Plain
Meaning

42.7%

25.3%

68

145

64

44

(n=103)

(n=174)

28.6%

18.2%

Dictionary Rule

28

75

25

16

(n=56)

(n=88)

34.5%

21.1%

Other Statutes

80

44

33

20

(n=58)

(n=95)

24.7%

14.1%

(n=85)

(n=149)

21.8%

12.7%

(n=78)

(n=134)

13.3%

8.2%

(n=30)

(n=49)

6.8%

4.9%

(n=44)

(n=61)

Language
Canons + Whole
Act Rule

Whole Act Rule
Grammar or
Linguistic
Canons
Substantive
Canons

54

56

19

17

117

103

38

37

40

35

14

26

21

17

4

3

22.2%

11.5%
(n=52)

Common Law

25

40

12

6

(n=27)
24.7%

19.6%

Purpose

30

75

47

20

(n=77)

(n=107)

I believe the former is a better measure of the rate at which the Court “dueled” over the canons
and other interpretive tools. If Table 1 used the total number of cases in the dataset as the
denominator for calculating the rate of dueling, that would count as potential dueling canon
cases those cases in which no member of the Court referenced a particular canon or tool. But
cases in which no opinion referenced a particular interpretive tool might be cases in which no
on-point legislative history existed, or in which no other statutes were analogous to the one at
issue, and so on. In any event, it would not provide a good measure of how frequently the
Justices found it necessary to counter each others’ claims that a particular interpretive resource
supported a particular statutory construction. For the sake of thoroughness, I note that if Table
1 were to use the total number of cases in the dataset (255) as the denominator for its
calculations, the rates of dueling would be significantly lower for every interpretive canon and
tool (e.g., SCP – 22.7%, Plain Meaning – 17.3%, Dictionary – 6.3%, Other Statutes – 7.8%,
Language/Whole Act – 8.2%, Purpose – 7.8%, Practical Consequences – 11.4%, Intent – 5.1%,
Legislative History – 7.5%).
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Dueling

Percent

Opinions

Dueling In

Percent

Divided-

Dueling

Unanimous

Majority

Dissenting

(Majority or

Cases

Opinions

Opinions

Concurrence

Vote

In All

(n=115)*

(n=255)

(n=155)

+ Dissent)†

Cases‡

Cases˚

Practical
Consequences

30.9%

20.9%

45

93

69

29

(n=94)

(n=139)

26.5%

18.3%

Intent

22

40

39

13

(n=49)

(n=71)

Legislative
History

25.3%

17.6%

32

74

47

19

(n=75)

(n=108)

* This column reports the number unanimous cases in which the majority opinion invoked an
interpretive tool to support its chosen construction.
** This column includes a small number of double-counts for cases in which more than one
dissenting opinion referenced the interpretive tool.
† This column counts the number of cases in which both the majority and one or more
dissenting opinions relied on the interpretive tool to support its construction and a few cases in
which a concurring opinion and at least one dissenting opinion relied on the interpretive tool.
As explained in the article’s methodology section, the figures reported in this column do not
include cases in which one opinion relied on the interpretive tool and an opposing opinion
rejected the tool as inapplicable or criticized the opposing opinion’s reliance on the tool.
‡ Percentages in this column were calculated by dividing the number of cases that dueled over
this interpretive tool (reported in previous column) by the number of divided-vote cases in the
dataset in which at least one opinion relied on the tool to support its statutory construction
(reflected in the figure n=90 for Supreme Court precedent, n=104 for Text/Plain meaning, and
so on).
˚ Percentages in this column were calculated by dividing the number of cases that dueled over
this interpretive tool (reported in the fourth column) by the total number of cases in the dataset
in which at least one opinion relied on the tool to support its statutory construction, including
unanimous cases (reflected in the figure n=177 for Supreme Court precedent, n=175 for
Text/Plain meaning, and so on).

The data reveal several surprising results. First, prior Supreme
Court precedent and text/plain meaning show very high rates of
dueling during the Roberts Court’s first five-and-a-half terms—the
Justices dueled over the application of Supreme Court precedent in
63.7 percent of the divided-vote cases in which at least one opinion
cited precedent, and they dueled over text/plain meaning in 42.7
percent of the divided-vote cases in which at least one opinion found
64
a clear statutory meaning. (The percentages are significantly lower
when unanimous cases are included in the count, but still higher than
for other interpretive resources). Practical consequences and other
statutes exhibited the next-highest rates of dueling, generating

64. See supra Table 1.
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competing judicial references in 30.9 percent and 34.5 percent of the
divided-vote cases that referenced either resource, respectively. By
contrast, the Justices dueled over purpose, legislative history, and
intent in roughly 25.0 percent of the cases in which they invoked these
tools. The rates for these interpretive tools are almost identical to the
rates at which the Justices dueled over textualist-preferred tools, such
as dictionary definitions (28.6 percent), the whole act rule (21.8
percent) and the combined grammar/language canons/whole act rule
(24.7 percent), and the common law (22.2 percent). Finally, the data
revealed that the Justices rarely dueled over substantive canons, at a
65
rate of just 10.4 percent.
In short, the Court engaged in the highest rates of dueling canon
or interpretive tool use when invoking traditional tools of legal
analysis—i.e., precedent, text, and to a lesser extent, practical
consequences—not when invoking statutory-interpretation-specific
tools such as the language or substantive canons, statutory purpose,
legislative history, the whole act rule, or dictionary definitions. The
only statutory-interpretation-specific tool for which the Justices
exhibited rates of dueling comparable to those exhibited for
traditional legal tools was other statutes—an interpretive tool which
requires traditional legal analysis of prior Supreme Court precedents
interpreting analogous statutory provisions, in addition to the
statutory-interpretation-specific task of making analogies across
66
statutes.
The data are intriguing on many levels. First, the relatively low
rate of dueling over dictionary definitions is noteworthy and
unexpected. Dictionary definitions are bountiful; there are numerous
dictionaries in print and each dictionary typically contains several
definitions for the same word. Moreover, a recent study of the
Supreme Court’s dictionary usage from 1986–2010 found that the
Justices’ choices regarding which dictionary to cite to be “largely ad
hoc, based on the appeal of particular dictionaries in particular

65. I counted as substantive canon “duels” those cases in which a majority opinion cited
one substantive canon (e.g., the rule of lenity) and an opposing opinion cited another
substantive canon (e.g., the constitutional avoidance canon). I did not count as “dueling” cases
in which a majority opinion invoked the rule of lenity and the dissenting opinion argued that the
rule was not applicable. See supra Part II.A.
66. Specifically, for statutes deemed in pari materia (in the same matter), “courts will apply
prior judicial interpretations” of a particular term both “to subsequent cases that arise under the
statute actually interpreted [and] also to identical or similar language in other statutes
addressing similar issues.” See Widiss, supra note 15, at 871.
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cases.” That study also found that in the vast majority of cases,
judicial opinions that referenced dictionary definitions used them as
“ornament[s]”—meaning that the dictionary played a minimal
substantive role in the opinion’s reasoning, but nevertheless was used
to “lend[] a patina of objectivity and legitimacy” to the chosen
68
construction. Given the abundance of dictionary definitions and
empirical evidence indicating that the Justices use them in an ad hoc
manner, one would expect that jurists seeking to use this interpretive
tool readily could find some definition to support almost any
construction of a statute—and that majority and dissenting opinions
in the same case frequently would employ competing dictionary
definitions, however marginally helpful, to cancel out any aura of
objectivity that an opposing opinion might gain from using such
definitions.
Thus, the low rate of dueling dictionary use—28.6 percent—is
69
puzzling. One explanation could be that the Justices tend to prefer a
handful of dictionaries, so that despite the abundance of dictionaries
and definitions in publication, competing definitions may not be
70
readily available within their preferred lexical universe. But upon
closer examination, this explanation seems insufficient for at least two
reasons. First, the Court’s opinions in recent cases like Taniguchi v.
71
Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. demonstrate that despite the Justices’
individual preferences for certain dictionaries, they are perfectly
willing to reference other dictionaries (as many as fourteen in
72
Taniguchi!). Second, empirical research shows that even those
Justices with the most pronounced dictionary preferences deviate
73
from their preferred dictionary in a substantial number of cases.
67. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 537 (2013).
68. Id. at 548.
69. This finding is consistent with the 28.8 percent rate of dueling dictionary use found in
Brudney and Baum’s study of employment law, business and commercial law, and criminal-law
cases from 1986 to 2010. See id. at 526.
70. My earlier empirical study of the Roberts Court and Brudney & Baum’s recent study of
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts found that the Justices cited the following five dictionaries
most frequently: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary,
Webster’s Second New International Dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, and
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 529; Krishnakumar, supra note
17, at 240 n.85.
71. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
72. See id. at 2002–03, 2003 n.2.
73. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 530–31; Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at
240 n.85.
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Another possible explanation for the relatively low rate of
judicial dueling over dictionary references is that, despite the
availability of numerous dictionaries, there may have been no
competing definition available in the forty cases in the dataset in
which majority or dissenting opinions declined to counter an
opposing opinion’s dictionary reference(s). In order to test this
possibility, I (or a research assistant) examined the briefs in thirtyeight of the forty cases in which a majority or dissenting opinion
referenced a dictionary definition, but the opposing opinion(s) did
74
not counter that reference. In the vast majority of the cases (67.5
percent), both the petitioner and the respondent (or, in some cases,
amici) had provided dictionary definitions supporting their respective
statutory constructions. Moreover, in another handful of cases, the
party whose interpretation was favored by the opinion that did not
invoke a dictionary definition did provide a supporting dictionary
75
definition in its brief. Ultimately, in 75.0 percent (thirty out of forty)
of the cases in which a majority or dissenting opinion declined to
counter a dictionary reference in an opposing opinion, at least one
brief supporting the opposing opinion provided a helpful dictionary
definition. Thus, the lack of availability of opposing definitions does
not seem to explain the low level of dueling—nor does a lack of
framing by litigants and attorneys.
A third possibility is that the Justices are motivated to counter an
opposing opinion’s dictionary references only, or primarily, in those
cases in which the opposing opinion relies significantly on dictionary
definitions to reach its statutory construction—and tend to leave
unanswered those dictionary references that are used merely as
“ornaments.” I explore this possibility further in the doctrinal analysis
76
conducted in Section III.B.
Second, the Roberts Court’s relatively low rate of dueling over
legislative history is quite surprising. The legislative history of most
federal statutes is extensive, and debate on the House and Senate
floor often produces competing statements about a statute’s

74. Briefs were not available online for the other two cases.
75. See, e.g., Brief for the State of Cal. at 44–46, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (Nos. 07-1601 & 07-1607); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, 15, Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389
(2008) (No. 06-1322); Brief for the Petitioners at 16–17, Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (No. 05-1508).
76. See infra Part III.B.1.
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meaning. Accordingly, as with dictionary definitions, one would
expect there to be “something for everyone” in the legislative
history—and for this to translate into frequent dueling over this
interpretive resource. Yet the data from this study reveal judicial
dueling over legislative history in only 25.3 percent of the dividedvote cases. Part III will explore the theoretical implications of this
finding in detail, but for now it bears noting two possible explanations
for the data: On the one hand, the conventional wisdom could simply
be wrong, and the legislative history of many statutes may not in fact
contain support for competing characterizations of the statute’s
meaning. Alternatively, the Justices who make legislative history
references may not be citing directly on-point “smoking gun”
statements, and those authoring opposing opinions accordingly may
not consider it crucial to counter such legislative history citations.
Third, the low rate of judicial dueling over substantive canons
also is unexpected. Substantive canons are judicially created
interpretive presumptions and rules based on background legal
78
norms, policies and conventions. They reflect judicially preferred
policy positions, expressed as rules of thumb about how to treat
statutory text in light of constitutional priorities, common-law
practices, or specific statute-based policies. Because substantive
canons are policy-based, there often are two or more that point in
opposite directions. Indeed, Llewellyn lists in his “thrust” column the
substantive canon that “[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law
will not be extended by construction” and, as its “parry,” the
countercanon that “[s]uch acts will be liberally construed if their
79
nature is remedial.” Accordingly, it seems surprising that the
members of the Roberts Court dueled over substantive canons at a
80
rate of only 10.9 percent.
Last, the high rates of judicial dueling over precedent and
practical reasoning, as compared to the low rates of dueling over
purpose, legislative history, the whole act rule, and the like suggest

77. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 36 (“Legislative history provides, moreover, a
uniquely broad playing field. In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is
extensive, and there is something for everybody.”); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Often there is so much legislative history that a court can manipulate
the meaning of a law by choosing which snippets to emphasize . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 276
(1994); Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 13.
79. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 401.
80. See supra Table 1.
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that the canons and tools of statutory construction may not be as
readily manipulable as the traditional tools of legal analysis that
Llewellyn sought to compare them to in his article. Or, at the least,
the Justices on the Roberts Court do not seem as inclined to use the
tools of statutory construction to counter each other as they do to use
the common-law tools of analysis in a dueling manner.
Before we rush to conclude that the Court rarely duels over
statutory-interpretation-specific tools, however, it is worth looking at
the rate of dueling by case type rather than by individual interpretive
tool. As Table 2a shows, only 88 of 255 statutory cases decided during
the period studied (34.5 percent) involved competing references to
the same interpretive tool in both a majority and a dissenting opinion,
excluding cases in which the Justices dueled only over Supreme Court
81
precedent or practical consequences. This is not a trivial number, but
neither does it constitute a terribly high rate of dueling. If we separate
out unanimous cases and focus on the 140 cases in which the Justices
divided over a statute’s construction, the rate climbs significantly,
indicating that the Roberts Court engaged in dueling canon use in
62.9 percent of such cases. Put differently, a large majority of the
cases in which the Justices disagreed over the construction of the
statute involved majority–dissent dueling over the same interpretive
canon or tool.

81. One-hundred and thirteen of the cases involved some kind of dueling, but in nineteen
of these the Court dueled only over the application of its own precedent, and in another six it
dueled only over the application of practical consequences reasoning (three) or over precedent
and practical reasoning (three). In my view, cases in which the Court dueled only over
precedent and/or practical consequences should not count as “dueling canon” cases because
precedent and practical consequences are general tools of legal analysis, not canons or tools
specific to statutory construction. If we count these precedent-only or practical-only cases, then
44.3 percent of the cases involved “dueling.”
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Table 2a: Dueling Canon Use by Vote Margin*

All Cases (Including
Unanimous Cases)
(n=255)
Divided-Vote Cases
(n=140)
Close-Margin Cases
(5–4 / 5–3)
(n=53)

Percent Dueling Over
Statutory InterpretationSpecific Tools (n)

Percent Dueling Over All Legal
Analysis Tools (Including
Precedent-Only and PracticalOnly Dueling) (n)

34.5% (88)

44.3% (113)

62.9% (88)

80.7% (113)

64.2% (34)

84.9% (45)

Wide-Margin Cases
(n=87)
62.1% (54)
78.2% (68)
*
A chi-squared test revealed no statistical difference between rates of dueling for close-margin
versus wide-margin cases.

In addition, when the Justices used the interpretive tools in a
dueling fashion, they tended to do so on multiple levels, dueling over
numerous resources. Indeed, the members of the Roberts Court
dueled over two or more interpretive tools in 83.0 percent of the
eighty-eight dueling canon cases. Only fifteen of the eighty-eight
dueling canon cases (17.0 percent) involved majority and dissenting
82
opinions that dueled over only one interpretive tool. Further, as
Table 2b below shows, the data from the Roberts Court’s first five
terms are consistent with the Brudney–Ditslear and Law–Zaring
findings that dissenting opinions were significantly more likely to
invoke a canon or legislative history when the majority opinion relied
on that interpretive resource than when the majority opinion did not.
On the one hand, this finding could be taken to demonstrate that the
Justices are strategic in their interpretive tool use—tailoring their
references to counter the specific tools relied on by an opposing
opinion rather than referencing only those tools they independently
find compelling. This is the conclusion that Brudney–Ditslear and
83
Law–Zaring reached based on similar data. On the other hand, the

82. See infra Appendix (listing each “dueling canon” case and all tools over which majority
and dissenting opinions dueled by case). If we include cases that involve dueling only over
precedent or practical consequences, then thirty-seven of one-hundred and thirteen or 32.7
percent of the dueling cases involved dueling over only one interpretive tool.
83. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 96; Law & Zaring,
supra note 5, at 1738.
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cases in which a majority opinion references a particular interpretive
tool may also be cases in which citation to that tool is more
appropriate than in the average case. In many cases, for example, the
legislative history may not contain on-point discussion of the relevant
statutory issue; in those cases where it does, and the majority
references that discussion, a competing comment about the statutory
provision may also be available. Thus we should be cautious before
84
ascribing too much meaning to this statistic.
Table 2b: Dissenting Opinion Reliance on Canons and Other
Interpretative Tools
Dissenting Opinion
Reliance Absent Majority
Opinion References

Dissenting Opinion Reliance
When Majority Opinion
Invokes the Canon/Tool

Text / Plain Meaning

32.3% (20 out of 62)

56.4% (44 out of 78)

Dictionary

10.6% (10 out of 94)

34.8% (16 out of 46)

Other Statutes

13.5% (13 out of 96)

45.5% (20 out of 44)

Grammar / Whole Act Rule

24.7% (19 out of 77)

33.3% (21 out of 63)

Substantive Canons

19.5% (23 out of 118)

13.6% (3 out of 22)

Common Law

5.0% (6 out of 121)

31.6% (6 out of 19)

Purpose

30.8% (28 out of 91)

38.8% (19 out of 49)

Intent

22.0% (26 out of 118)

59.1% (13 out of 22)

Legislative History

28.9% (28 out of 97)

44.2% (19 out of 43)

Practical Consequences

49.4% (40 out of 81)

49.2% (29 out of 59)

Supreme Court Precedent

32.7% (17 out of 52)

65.9% (58 out of 88)

Language Canons /

Overall, the data regarding the frequency of dueling canons
provide a mixed picture. The rates of judicial dueling for most
individual tools of construction are low—certainly lower than I
expected to find for legislative history, dictionary references,
84. This is also why I believe that Table 1—which measures not only the extent to which
dissenting opinions respond to a majority or concurring opinion’s reliance on a particular
interpretive tool, but also the extent to which majority or concurring opinions respond to a
dissenting opinion’s reliance on the tool—provides a better gauge of judicial dueling than does
either the Brudney–Ditslear or the Law–Zaring study.
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language/whole act, and substantive canons. At the same time, a large
percentage of the Court’s divided-vote cases involved some level of
majority–dissent dueling over the same interpretive tool. Indeed, in
52.1 percent of the cases in which the Justices disagreed (73 of 140),
majority and dissenting opinions dueled over multiple canons or
tools. Thus, on the one hand, the worst implications of Llewellyn’s
“thrusts” and “parries” do not appear to be borne out, in that most
individual tools of construction are not being pitted against
themselves in the vast majority of cases. On the other hand, however,
the tools of statutory construction hardly seem to constrain the
Justices or point neatly to one correct interpretation, as nearly twothirds of the Court’s divided-vote cases (88 of 140) contained
competing applications of the same interpretive tool.
2. Statutory Subject Matter. If we break the cases down by
statutory subject matter, the data become still more interesting. As
Table 3a illustrates, subject matter seems to have a notable
correlation to the rate at which the Roberts Court dueled over one or
more interpretive canons when interpreting the statute. Table 3a
reports the percentage of all dueling canon cases that involve statutes
85
in a particular subject area. Caution should be used in interpreting
these figures because once the data are disaggregated by statutory
subject matter, the number of case observations dips significantly.
Accordingly, this Article focuses on only the most striking data from
Table 3a: criminal and antidiscrimination statutes each made up a
substantial proportion of the Roberts Court’s dueling canon cases;
nearly 40 percent of the cases in which the Court dueled involved a
86
statute that fell within one of these two subject areas. If we add in
cases construing environmental statutes, nearly half (46.5 percent) of
87
the Court’s dueling canon cases are accounted for.

85. See infra Table 3a.
86. See id.
87. Of the 255 statutory cases decided during the period studied, 32.9 percent involved
criminal (21.1 percent) or antidiscrimination (11.8 percent) statutes. If we add in environmental
law cases, the percentage of the Court’s docket that involved these types of statutes was 37.3
percent. So the proportion of dueling cases accounted for by these statutory subject areas (46.5
percent) was a bit higher than the proportion of overall statutory cases that involved these
subject areas.
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Table 3a: Dueling Canon Use by Subject Area
Percentage of All Dueling Cases That
Involve Statutes in this Subject Area
(n=88)
Criminal
(incl. AEDPA)
Discrimination
(incl. IDEA)

26.1% (23)
13.6% (12)

Environmental
Jurisdictional
(not incl. criminal)

6.8% (6)
4.5% (4)

Preemption

5.7% (5)

FAA

3.4% (3)

Securities

3.4% (3)

Bankruptcy

5.7% (5)

Immigration

2.3% (2)

Communications Act

2.3% (2)

False Claims Act

2.3% (2)

NLRA / Employment

2.3% (2)

&

Other
21.6% (19)
Fourteen statutes/subject areas generated only one dueling canon case: Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act; Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; Employee
Retirement Income Security Act; Railroads; Fair Debt Collection Act; Religion; Federal Tort
Claims Act; Freedom of Information Act; Tax; Indian law; Attorneys’ Fees; Federal Power Act;
National Banking Act; Jones Act. Three others generated two dueling canon cases each: the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, statutes dealing with Procedure, and Intellectual Property.

&

This subject-matter sensitivity could be one reason why the
Brudney–Ditslear study reported greater overall dueling canon use
than Table 1 suggests. Because Brudney–Ditslear reviewed only
employment cases, including many antidiscrimination cases based on
statutes such as Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (AEDA), their study
may unwittingly have selected a subset of statutory cases that are
particularly susceptible to judicial dueling.
The subject-matter data naturally raise the question: Why? What
is it about criminal, antidiscrimination, and environmental statutes
that makes the Roberts Court particularly likely to duel over canons
and interpretive tools? One possibility is that there is something
about statutes in these subject areas that gives rise to greater
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indeterminacy or to competing applications of interpretive tools than
is the case for statutes in other subject areas. For example, Congress
often borrows language from existing criminal statutes when it writes
new ones, particularly when a new statute deals with the same type of
88
underlying conduct as older statutes. Similarly, Congress often uses
Title VII or the Fair Labor Standards Act as the template for other,
89
newer antidiscrimination statutes. As a result, there may be multiple
analogous statutes available for the Justices to choose from when
applying the other statutes tool to help decipher the meaning of a
90
criminal or antidiscrimination statute. Alternately, statutes in these
subject areas may reflect more ideologically charged legislative
battles than do other statutes, giving rise to cross cutting statements in
the legislative record, including competing claims about statutory
purpose. Thus, there might be a large quantity of contradictory
legislative history or statutory purposes available to the Justices when
construing statutes in these subject areas.
As Table 3b shows, the data contain some evidence that is
consistent with these explanations. But the evidence is modest and
does not hold for all three subject areas. For example, nearly onefourth of the dueling canon criminal cases contained dueling
references to the other statutes and legislative history tools, as did
one-fourth of the dueling canon antidiscrimination cases—but none
91
of the environmental cases dueled over either of these tools.
Conversely, one-third of the dueling canon environmental cases
contained dueling references to statutory purpose, but the figures
92
were much lower for dueling criminal and antidiscrimination cases.

88. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 234 (1999) (referencing a robbery statute
that served as a model for the statute at issue).
89. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578–79 (1978) (noting that the ADEA was
modeled on both the FLSA and Title VII); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), as reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97 (“A number of other laws banning discrimination, including
[the ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title
VII.”).
90. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 234–36, 259–61 (discussing which of three model robbery
statutes was most analogous to statute at issue). Compare Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (citing numerous state statutes and federal regulations that
permit complaints to be filed orally), with Brief in Opposition at 6–8, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 09-834) (citing numerous different
analogous statutes to argue that complaints must be filed in writing).
91. See infra Table 3b.
92. See infra Table 3b.
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Table 3b: Subject Area Dueling
Criminal

Antidiscrimination

Environmental

Plain Meaning

43.5% (10)

41.7% (5)

33.3% (2)

Dictionary

13.0% (3)

8.3% (1)

33.3% (2)

Language/Whole Act Rule

26.1% (6)

16.7% (2)

33.3% (2)

Other Statutes

21.7% (5)

25.0% (3)

0.0% (0)

Purpose

4.3% (1)

16.7% (2)

33.3% (2)

Legislative History

21.7% (5)

25.0% (3)

0.0% (0)

Substantive Canons

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

Another possibility is that statutes in the criminal,
antidiscrimination, and environmental law areas reflect clearer
ideological dividing lines than do statutes dealing with other
93
subjects.
With respect to the environmental law and
antidiscrimination law cases, the statutes being interpreted typically
are sweeping progressive or social-justice statutes enacted during the
1960s by liberal Congresses—in a political climate very different from
94
the one that has existed during the Roberts Court’s tenure. Thus, the
clash between majority and dissenting opinions may be political, with
the liberal Justices seeking to preserve the original, broad goals of a
statute enacted in a more liberal era and the conservative Justices
seeking to curtail the modern application of the statute. As a result,
when construing statutes in these subject areas, the Justices’
ideological preferences may predominate and they may be more
inclined to use the canons to justify their preferred statutory
constructions than is the case with other, less controversial subject
areas. That is, the members of the Roberts Court (1) may be more
inclined in criminal, antidiscrimination, and environmental law cases
to start with their preferred outcomes and then look for ways to shape
the canons and interpretive tools to justify those outcomes; or (2) may

93. That is, government v. criminal defendant, employer v. employee, disability claimant v.
state, minority voters v. local authorities, or environmental interests v. private-property
interests.
94. Cf. Law & Zaring, supra note 5, at 1740 (concluding that the level of ideological
alignment between authoring justice and enacting Congress is a statistically significant predictor
of probability that a statutory interpretation opinion will reference legislative history).
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regard the stakes as higher for these cases and, accordingly, consider
it more necessary to neutralize the interpretive tools used by
opposing opinions.
There is some anecdotal evidence for this explanation: a number
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most memorable statutory interpretation
cases have involved significant judicial dueling over statutes in the
antidiscrimination and environmental law areas. Consider, for
example, the Rehnquist Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
95
Communities for a Great Oregon. Babbitt involved a section of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) that makes it unlawful for any person
96
to “take” an endangered species within the United States. The ESA
97
defines the term “take” to mean, in part, “to harm.” In 1975, the
Department of the Interior issued a regulation defining “‘[h]arm’ in
the definition of ‘take’” to include any activity that results in
“significant habitat modification . . . [that] significantly impair[s]
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
98
sheltering.” Babbitt raised the question whether the Department had
the authority, under the ESA, to prevent landowners from harming
99
endangered species by destroying their essential habitats.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Babbitt dueled over a
dizzying array of canons and interpretive tools, including dictionary
definitions, the plain meaning rule, noscitur a sociis, the whole act
100
rule, and legislative history. Despite their impressive repartee over
the canons, however, both opinions give the distinct impression of
being about much more than the neutral application of statutory
interpretation rules. The strong undercurrent of the conservative
dissenting opinion is that environmental statutes should be construed

95. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
96. See id. at 690; 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
98. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
99. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 692.
100. For example, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion argued that the plain meaning of
“take” encompasses only deliberate, intentional action directed toward individual animals, not
incidental injuries to habitat. Justice Stevens’ majority opinion countered that the ordinary
meaning of “harm” in the definition of “take” covers incidental injury of the kind caused by
habitat destruction. Compare Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 687, 697, 709 (stating that the dictionary
definition of “harm” includes “injure” and habitat modification which kills individual animals of
an endangered species causes “injury”), with id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is obvious
that ‘take’ in this sense . . . describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and
intentionally . . . .”).
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to interfere as little as possible with private-property rights; while
the underlying theme of the liberal majority opinion is that species
extinction poses grave threats to the environment and that the ESA’s
broad purpose of species preservation must trump private-property
102
103
interests. A recent case, Rapanos v. United States, which involved
a landowner’s right to backfill wetlands under the Clean Water Act,
reflects similar majority–dissent dueling on the surface, and a similar
underlying ideological battle over private-property rights versus
effective environmental preservation. The conservative plurality
opinion, for example, began by bemoaning the costly “burden of
federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in
locations denominated ‘waters of the United States,’” calling the
agency responsible for regulating wetlands “an enlightened despot,”
and complaining that “for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos
faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in
104
criminal and civil fines.” The liberal dissenting opinion, by contrast,
emphasized the Clean Water Act’s “Herculean goal of ending water
pollution” and the importance of wetlands for the preservation of
105
water quality.
In a similar vein is the Burger Court case United Steelworkers v.
106
Weber. Weber involved an early application of Title VII, raising the
question whether that statute should be read to bar private employers
from adopting voluntary affirmative action plans designed to remedy
107
the present effects of past discrimination against black employees.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Weber dueled over multiple
interpretive tools, including legislative history, purpose, and statutory
108
language. Most notably, the opinions engaged in an exhaustive
back-and-forth about various statements in the legislative history,

101. See id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding that the hunting and killing
prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of
financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land
conscripted to national zoological use.”).
102. See id. at 698 (majority opinion) (“[T]he broad purpose of the ESA supports the
Secretary’s decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms
Congress enacted the statute to avoid.”).
103. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
104. Id. at 721.
105. Id. at 787, 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
107. Id. at 197.
108. Id. at 206, 220, 230.
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often refuting each other’s claims point-for-point. Underlying this
extensive dueling, however, was a fundamental ideological battle over
affirmative action. The liberal majority opinion found it unimaginable
to read a statute designed to address centuries of discrimination
against black Americans in a manner that would prohibit voluntary
efforts by private employers to abolish the present-day effects of that
110
historical discrimination. The conservative dissenting opinion, by
contrast, found it equally odious to read the statute to allow
discrimination against white employees as the means for improving
111
black employees’ opportunities. Several of the Roberts Court’s
antidiscrimination cases reflect similar underlying judicial divides
over the appropriate reach of statutes designed to protect minorities
and women from employment or voting discrimination, even as the
majority and dissenting opinions duel over the application of specific
112
interpretive canons.
What, then, about the Court’s high rates of dueling canon use in
cases involving criminal statutes? After all, the statutes at issue in the
Court’s criminal-law cases generally are not the product of sweeping
social-justice movements. Despite this difference, criminal statutes
nevertheless may reflect clear ideological dividing lines, or
disagreement, over how the State should treat those accused of
crimes. Again, the Justices’ clear policy preferences may color the
way they apply the canons and interpretive tools and make them
more inclined to counter an opposing opinion’s use of such tools—not
109. See id. at 207, 207 n.7, 229, 230 n.11, 232, 232 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 202–04 (majority opinion).
111. See id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There is perhaps no device more destructive
to the notion of equality than the numerus clausus—the quota.”). A recent Roberts Court case,
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), involved a similar ideological clash over Title VII. See
id. at 563 (discussing the legality under Title VII of a municipality’s race-based promotion
practices). The majority and dissenting opinions in Ricci dueled over the whole act rule,
statutory purpose, and practical consequences, see id. at 583–84, 579–80, but again, the
underlying division was over the fairness of abandoning the results of a firefighter promotion
examination on which white firefighters significantly outperformed black firefighters, compare
id. at 593 (“Many of the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and
financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the
end of the process was all the more severe.”), with id. at 608–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that though “[t]he white firefighters who scored high on New Haven's promotional
exams understandably attract this Court’s sympathy . . . they had no vested right to promotion”
and that “[f]irefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an
especially long shadow”).
112. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583–84, 579–80, 608–11; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 6,
14–16, 27–29 (2009); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 704, 709 n.3, 720–721 (2008);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621, 628, 646–47 (2006).
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as a result of longstanding ideological divisions over sweeping statutes
enacted in a previous era, but because the Justices have strong views
about the moral culpability of certain behavior and about how the
government should punish those accused of such behavior.
Many of the Court’s criminal cases, for example, involve
sentencing statutes, and seem to reflect an underlying disagreement
about the harshness of applying a mandatory enhancement to
113
particular conduct. Consider Dean v. United States, in which the
Justices employed the whole act rule, other statutes, and common-law
rules in a dueling manner in determining whether a ten-year
sentencing enhancement applied to a defendant whose gun
114
accidentally discharged while he was robbing a bank. Although the
majority and principal dissenting opinions dueled over the structure
of the statute, the appropriate inferences to be drawn from the felony
murder statute (parallel v. meaningful variation), and common-law
rules about mens rea versus unintended consequences of unlawful
115
conduct, a strong policy disagreement about fairness seems to
underlie these more technical disagreements. Specifically, the
opinions seem to be motivated by a fundamental concern about
whether it is fair (majority) or unfair (dissent) to subject a criminal
defendant to an extra ten years in prison because his gun accidentally
116
discharged while he was committing a violent crime. Several of the
Court’s other criminal cases involve the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act and reflect ideological divisions about the equity
of cutting off death-penalty appeals. In such cases, the majority and
dissenting opinions often seem, at bottom, to be clashing over
different normative visions about access to the courts for death117
penalty appeals.
Overall, then, ideological divisions may explain the high
representation of environmental, antidiscrimination, and criminal
statutes among the dueling canon cases. Each of these subject areas

113. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
114. See id. at 570.
115. Compare id. at 572–73, 578, with id. at 575, 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
over comparisons to common-law crimes).
116. Compare id. at 576 (defendant was “guilty of unlawful conduct twice over”), with id. at
585 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress would not have intended to punish so harshly.”).
117. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (worrying about providing
“incentives for state prisoners to file certiorari petitions as a delay tactic”), with id. at 345
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s reading “deprive[s] unwitting
litigants of the opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims”).
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involves a hot-button issue that tends to divide the major political
parties and their supporters. As a result, statutes dealing with these
subject areas may be the product of extensive compromise between
legislators on opposite sides of the political divide. This in turn may
give rise to (1) an abundance of legislative history reflecting
competing visions of the statute’s reach, (2) statutory text that is
intentionally vague or susceptible to competing readings, or (3) a
heightened likelihood that the Justices charged with interpreting
these statutes will have individual policy preferences regarding how
such statutes should be implemented. Consequently, it may be the
case that statutes in these subject areas give rise to competing
applications of the same interpretive tool more frequently than do
statutes in other subject areas. Moreover, when construing statutes in
these subject areas, the Justices may be more likely to use the canons
and tools of statutory construction to justify a reading arrived at
through other means, rather than as a starting point. In contrast,
when construing statutes in other, less ideologically charged subject
areas, the Justices may be less inclined to use the canons to
counteract each other.
Another possibility raised by the subject-matter data is that the
Justices tend to duel at higher rates in cases involving a statute not
administered by an agency or a statute that is administered by a weak
agency. This hypothesis does not perfectly explain the data reported
in Table 3a, as environmental statutes are administered by the EPA, a
118
powerful agency. But lack of deference to an agency interpretation
could be part of the reason why so many of the dueling canon cases

118. Agencies are not all created equal. Congress grants some agencies expansive powers
and authority, while limiting the authority granted to others. The EPA is widely considered a
powerful agency because Congress has granted it broad powers under several statutes, including
the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 87 (1998) (“The [EPA] has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek
criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.”); Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch,
Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2191
(“Government again expanded the scope of regulation significantly in the 1970s with the
creation of powerful but not necessarily organizationally ‘independent’ regulatory authorities,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.”); Louis Jaffe, The
Disorder of Politics: Lowi Takes the High Road (Book Review), 24 STAN. L. REV. 587, 590
(1972) (book review) (“[EPA] by a continuing series of statutes has been given very powerful
anti-pollution tools allowing it to formulate and enforce air and water quality standards.”).
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119

involve criminal and antidiscrimination statutes (and why the next
largest category of dueling canon cases involves preemption and
120
bankruptcy statutes). Perhaps the Court engages in more extensive
statutory interpretation in cases that do not involve a respected
agency interpretation because in such cases it does not begin with a
presumption of deference to the agency’s construction. And perhaps
when the Court engages in more extensive statutory interpretation,
without the benefit of agency guidance (or with guidance from an
agency to which Congress has given limited power, like the EEOC),
the Justices are more inclined to duel over individual interpretive
tools.
3. Dueling Canons and Ideology. While evaluating the data, it
became clear that it would be useful to examine the relationship
between ideology and judicial dueling, both for purposes of
comparison to the Brudney–Ditslear study and because the subjectmatter data suggested the possibility that judicial dueling might be
more prevalent in cases with strong ideological dividing lines. Before
reporting the ideology data, however, a caveat is in order: It is
difficult to code case outcomes for ideology because it is not always
clear whether an outcome favoring a particular litigant is liberal or
conservative and coders necessarily must make judgment calls. In
order to minimize errors and to make this study as replicable as
possible, I coded for ideology by importing the ideological direction
coding from the Spaeth Supreme Court database for the cases in my
121
dataset.
Three results stand out. First, the “dueling canon” cases (i.e.,
cases in which the Court invoked the same interpretive tools to
support competing interpretations) skewed significantly conservative
compared to all statutory cases, and somewhat more conservative
122
than all divided-vote cases. Further, the more closely divided cases
were significantly more likely to inspire judicial dueling than were
cases decided by a wide margin. Second, when the Justices in majority

119. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a notoriously weak agency, to
which Congress has delegated limited power, and traditionally receives little deference from
courts. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
120. See supra Table 3a.
121. Legacy Datasets: 2014 Release 01, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://
supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 [http://perma.cc/RG9G-HM78].
122. See infra Table 4.
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and dissenting opinions invoked the interpretive canons in a
competing or dueling fashion, they tended to do so consistently with
their ideological preferences. Third, and by contrast, in the
unanimously decided cases the Justices tended to employ the
interpretive canons to support both liberal and conservative outcomes
at much more even rates. (That is, the conservative–liberal
differential for most canons was much closer).
Table 4: Ideology by Case Type
Conservative (n)

Liberal (n)

Neither (n)

All Statutory Cases
(n=255)

49.8% (127)

46.7% (119)

3.5% (9)

Dueling Cases
(n=88)

62.5% (55)

37.1% (33)

0.0% (0)

40.0%

53.0%

7.0%

57.9% (81)

41.4% (58)

0.7% (1)

Unanimous Cases
(n=115)
Divided-Vote Cases
(n=140)

Table 4 reports the ideological direction of the majority opinion
in all statutory cases, unanimous cases, divided-vote cases, and
dueling canon cases in the dataset. As the Table shows, the
conservative–liberal split for all statutory cases decided during the
time frame of the study was almost even, while the split for
unanimous cases skewed liberal by several percentage points
(thirteen percentage points). By contrast, the split for cases decided
by a divided vote skewed conservative by a decisive margin (over
sixteen percentage points). The largest conservative–liberal
differential occurred in the dueling canon cases, which skewed
conservative by a whopping thirty-two percentage points.
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Table 5: Dueling by Vote Margin
Percent of Cases
Within Vote
Margin
Involving
&
Dueling Canons

Percent of Dueling
Canon Cases
Decided By This
Vote Margin

Percent of Cases
Within Vote Margin
Involving Any Dueling
(Including PrecedentOnly and PracticalOnly Dueling)

5 or 4 Justice Majority
(5–4 / 5–3 / 4–1–4)
(n=53)

64.2%

38.6%

84.9%

5, 4, or 6 Justice
Majority Cases
(n=95)

68.4%

*

72.7%

84.2%

7 or More Justice
Majority Cases
(n=45)
51.1%
27.3%
73.3%
&
For purposes of this Table, “dueling canon use” refers to cases in which majority and
dissenting opinions (or, in a few cases, a concurrence and at least one dissenting opinion) both
employed the same statutory-interpretation-specific interpretive tools to reach different
statutory readings and case outcomes. This column does not include cases in which majority and
dissenting opinions dueled solely over the application of Supreme Court precedent, practical
reasoning, or both precedent and practical reasoning.
*
A chi-squared test showed that the difference between rates of dueling for opinions with six or
fewer Justices in the majority versus opinions with seven or more Justices in the majority
approached significance, at p=.084.

Table 5 reports the Roberts Court’s rate of dueling canon use in
divided-vote cases by vote margin. As the Table shows, the
overwhelming majority of the dueling canon cases were decided with
six or fewer Justices joining the majority opinion (72.7 percent), and
more than half of those cases were decided by extremely close vote
margins, usually 5–4 or 5–3. Cases in which seven or more Justices
agreed on a statute’s construction represented a much smaller
percentage of the dueling canon cases (27.3 percent). Moreover, a
large majority of all cases decided by close vote margins contained
judicial dueling over the canons and other interpretive tools. In other
words, the Justices were most likely to engage the interpretive canons
and tools in a dueling manner when their levels of consensus were
low.
It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these
numbers, as they show only correlation, not causation. But a number
of possible explanations are worth exploring. On the one hand, close
vote margins could reflect statutory ambiguity. That is, the Justices
could be dividing closely because the statutes at issue lend themselves
to multiple plausible readings. In cases involving such ambiguous
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statutes, individual interpretive canons and tools may be particularly
likely to point in multiple directions. Thus, the Justices could be
dividing closely because individual canons and tools are pointing in
competing directions, and they could be dueling over the canons’
application because the canons point in multiple directions.
Alternately, the close margin cases may involve issues that are
particularly ideologically charged. The Justices could be deciding
these cases based on their ideological preferences—choosing their
preferred readings first, and then employing the canons in a dueling
fashion in order to justify their constructions and neutralize opposing
arguments.
Statistical observations cannot reveal the Justices’ internal
motivations for voting a particular way in a particular case—and in
this context cannot tell us whether the Justices duel at higher rates in
close-vote-margin cases because of statutory ambiguity, ideological
preferences, or some other factor. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to
understand as much as we can about how the Justices duel over
individual interpretive canons when they choose to do so. In an effort
to gain a more granular understanding of the Justices’ dueling
practices, Tables 6a–6g report the ideological direction of each
individual Justice’s vote in cases in which the justice authored or
joined an opinion that employed a particular interpretive tool in a
123
dueling manner.

123. Figures are not reported for dueling over substantive canons or the common-law
precedent interpretive tool because there were only 5–6 cases involving dueling over each of
these interpretive tools.
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Table 6a: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Legislative History Cases
(n=19)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

68.4% (13)

10.5% (2)

21.1% (4)

58.1%

Thomas

Conservative

63.2% (12)

15.8% (3)

21.1% (4)

47.4%

Roberts

Conservative

52.6% (10)

21.1% (4)

26.3% (5)

31.5%

Alito

Conservative

73.7% (14)

15.8% (3)

10.5% (2)

57.9%

Kennedy

Conservative

42.1% (8)

42.1% (8)

15.8% (3)

0.0%

Souter

Liberal

21.1% (4)

36.8% (7)

42.1% (8)

-15.7%

Ginsburg

Liberal

31.6% (6)

57.9% (11)

10.5% (2)

-26.3%

Breyer

Liberal

15.8% (3)

68.4% (13)

15.8% (3)

-52.6%

Stevens

Liberal

15.8% (3)

63.2% (12)

21.1% (4)

-47.4%

Sotomayor

Liberal

10.5% (2)

21.1% (4)

68.4% (13)

--

Kagan
Liberal
5.2% (1)
10.5% (2)
84.2% (16)
-Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.
τ

Table 6b: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Purpose Cases (n=19)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

63.2% (12)

26.3% (5)

10.5% (2)

36.9%

Thomas

Conservative

68.4% (13)

26.3% (5)

5.26% (1)

42.1%

Roberts

Conservative

68.4% (13)

26.3% (5)

5.26% (1)

42.1%

Alito

Conservative

78.9% (15)

15.8% (3)

5.26% (1)

63.1%

Kennedy

Conservative

73.7% (14)

26.3% (5)

0.0% (0)

47.4%

Souter

Liberal

26.3% (5)

31.6% (6)

42.1% (8)

-5.3%

Ginsburg

Liberal

21.1% (4)

78.9% (15)

0.0% (0)

-57.8%

Breyer

Liberal

36.8% (7)

63.2% (12)

0.0.% (0)

-26.5%

Stevens

Liberal

15.8% (3)

68.4% (13)

15.8% (3)

-52.6%

Sotomayor

Liberal

10.5% (2)

26.3% (5)

63.2% (12)

--

Kagan
Liberal
5.26% (1)
5.26% (1)
89.4% (17)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.
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Table 6c: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Dictionary Cases (n=16)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

50.0% (8)

50.0% (8)

0.0% (0)

0.0%

Thomas

Conservative

62.5% (10)

37.5% (6)

0.0% (0)

25.0%

Roberts

Conservative

50.0% (8)

43.75% (7)

6.25% (1)

6.25%

Alito

Conservative

75.0% (12)

25.0% (4)

0.0% (0)

50.0%

Kennedy

Conservative

56.25% (9)

43.75% (7)

0.0% (0)

12.5%

Souter

Liberal

18.75% (3)

43.75% (7)

37.5% (6)

-25.0%

Ginsburg

Liberal

37.5% (6)

62.5% (10)

0.0% (0)

-25.0%

Breyer

Liberal

25.0% (4)

75.0% (12)

0.0% (0)

-50.0%

Stevens

Liberal

18.75% (3)

62.5% (10)

18.75% (3)

-50.0%

Sotomayor

Liberal

12.5% (2)

37.5% (4)

62.5% (10)

--

Kagan
Liberal
0.0% (0)
0.0% (0)
100.0% (16)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.

Table 6d: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Language/Grammar/Whole Act
Cases (n=21)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

71.4% (15)

28.6% (6)

0.0% (0)

42.8%

Thomas

Conservative

85.7% (18)

14.3% (3)

0.0% (0)

71.4%

Roberts

Conservative

57.1% (12)

38.1% (8)

4.8% (1)

19.0%

Alito

Conservative

71.4% (15)

28.6% (6)

0.0% (0)

42.8%

Kennedy

Conservative

57.1% (12)

38.1% (8)

4.8% (1)

19.0%

Souter

Liberal

28.6% (6)

57.1% (12)

14.3% (3)

-28.5%

Ginsburg

Liberal

28.6% (6)

61.9% (13)

9.5% (2)

-33.3%

Breyer

Liberal

9.5% (2)

66.7% (14)

23.8% (5)

-57.2%

Stevens

Liberal

0.0% (0)

76.2% (16)

23.8% (5)

-76.2%

Sotomayor

Liberal

0.0% (0)

9.5% (2)

90.5% (19)

--

Kagan
Liberal
0.0% (0)
0.0(0)
100.0% (21)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.
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Table 6e: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Other Statutes Cases (n=20)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

65.0% (13)

30.0% (6)

5.0% (1)

35.0%

Thomas

Conservative

65.0% (13)

35.0% (7)

0.0% (0)

30.0%

Roberts

Conservative

55.0% (11)

40.0% (8)

5.0% (1)

15.0%

Alito

Conservative

55.0% (11)

40.0% (8)

5.0% (1)

15.0%

Kennedy

Conservative

55.0% (11)

40.0% (8)

5.0% (1)

15.0%

Souter

Liberal

30.0% (6)

45.0% (9)

25.0% (5)

-5.0%

Ginsburg

Liberal

30.0% (6)

65.0% (13)

5.0% (1)

-35.0%

Breyer

Liberal

15.0% (3)

85.0% (17)

0.0% (0)

-70.0%

Stevens

Liberal

15.0% (3)

75.0% (15)

10.0% (2)

-60.0%

Sotomayor

Liberal

0.0% (0)

20.0% (4)

80.0% (16)

--

Kagan
Liberal
0.0% (0)
0.0% (0)
100.0% (20)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.

Table 6f: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Plain Meaning Cases (n=43)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

61.4% (27)

34.1% (15)

4.5% (2)

27.3%

Thomas

Conservative

72.7% (32)

22.7% (10)

4.5% (2)

50.0%

Roberts

Conservative

50.0% (22)

45.5% (20)

4.5% (2)

4.5%

Alito

Conservative

63.6% (28)

31.8% (14)

4.5% (2)

31.8%

Kennedy

Conservative

50.0% (22)

50.0% (22)

0.0% (0)

0.0%

Souter

Liberal

15.9% (7)

43.2% (19)

40.9% (18)

-27.3%

Ginsburg

Liberal

36.3% (16)

56.8% (25)

6.8% (3)

-20.5%

Breyer

Liberal

29.5% (13)

61.4% (27)

9.1% (4)

-31.9%

Stevens

Liberal

13.6% (6)

65.9% (29)

20.5% (9)

-52.3%

Sotomayor

Liberal

11.4% (5)

15.9% (7)

72.7% (32)

--

Kagan
Liberal
4.5% (2)
11.4% (5)
84.1% (37)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over text or plain meaning in which
the Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced text or plain meaning to reach a
liberal outcome.
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Table 6g: Judicial Ideology in Dueling Legislative Intent Cases (n=13)

Justice

Justice
Ideology

Percent
Conservativeτ

Percent
Liberalϑ

Percent Not
Participating
/ Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Scalia

Conservative

76.9% (10)

23.1% (3)

0.0% (0)

53.8%

Thomas

Conservative

76.9% (10)

23.1% (3)

0.0% (0)

53.8%

Roberts

Conservative

76.9% (10)

15.4% (2)

7.7% (1)

62.5%
30.7%

Alito

Conservative

61.5% (8)

30.8% (4)

7.7% (1)

Kennedy

Conservative

69.2% (9)

30.8% (4)

0.0% (0)

38.4%

Souter

Liberal

30.8% (4)

69.2% (8)

7.7% (1)

-38.4%

Ginsburg

Liberal

46.2% (6)

53.8% (7)

0.0% (0)

-7.6%

Breyer

Liberal

46.2% (6)

46.2% (6)

7.7% (1)

0.0%

Stevens

Liberal

0.0%

92.3% (12)

7.7% (1)

92.3%

Sotomayor

Liberal

0.0% (0)

7.7% (1)

92.3% (12)

--

Kagan
Liberal
0.0% (0)
7.7% (1)
92.3% (12)
-τ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a conservative outcome.
ϑ
Percentage of cases involving majority–dissenting dueling over legislative intent in which the
Justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced intent to reach a liberal outcome.

The results are striking. They reveal that when the members of
the Roberts Court duel over interpretive canons or tools, they do so
in a manner that strongly correlates with their ideological
preferences. Many of the conservative Justices used particular canons
or tools to reach conservative outcomes in over 60 percent, and even
over 70 percent of the cases, while the liberal Justices used those
same canons or tools to reach liberal outcomes at similarly high rates
in those same cases. Strikingly, in the nineteen cases in which the
Court dueled over legislative history, Justice Scalia authored or
joined an opinion that used legislative history to reach conservative
results 68.4 percent of the time, and liberal results 10.5 percent of the
124
time. The figures for Justice Thomas were similar, as were those for
Justices Alito and Roberts. In contrast, the liberal Justices referenced
legislative history to reach liberal results in the overwhelming
majority (57.9 percent to 68.4 percent) of these same cases, and to
125
reach conservative results in only 15.8–31.6 percent of the cases.
124. In the remaining cases, Justice Scalia failed to join an opinion that referenced
legislative history.
125. This calculation does not include Justice Souter, who retired from the Court in 2009,
and did not participate in cases decided during two out of the five terms studied in the dataset
(including nearly half of the dueling legislative history cases). It also does not include Justices
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The Justices’ dueling over other canons and interpretive tools shows
126
similarly stark ideological-slanting.
These findings are consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s
findings that conservative Justices tend to invoke the canons to reach
conservative outcomes, while liberal Justices tend to invoke the
127
canons to support liberal outcomes. But these findings also deepen,
or expand, on the Brudney–Ditslear study by demonstrating that the
ideological slanting applies to interpretive tools other than the
language and substantive canons, and by revealing that the
ideological slanting is particularly forceful in the dueling canon cases.
Further, the data in Tables 6a–6g suggests that the canons do not
constrain the Justices on the Roberts Court to vote against their
policy preferences, providing some support for Llewellyn’s legal
realist view that judges do not decide cases based on neutral legal
rules.
The data in Table 6a also seem to contradict Brudney and
Ditslear’s findings on the ideologically constraining effects of
legislative history. Brudney and Ditslear found that liberal Justices
were more likely to vote in favor of employer interests (that is,
against their ideological preferences) when they invoked legislative
128
history, and that during the Burger Court, conservative Justices
were more likely to vote in favor of employee interests when they
129
relied on legislative history. After 1986, the Brudney–Ditslear study
reported that conservative Justices ruled increasingly in favor of
130
employers, even when relying on legislative history. Table 6a shows,
by contrast, that when the Justices dueled over legislative history,
conservative Justices were highly likely to vote in favor of
conservative outcomes and liberal Justices were highly likely to vote
in favor of liberal outcomes. Even if we set aside the data regarding
the conservative Justices’ voting patterns on the theory that they are
consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s findings for post-1986 cases,
the data regarding the ideological direction of the liberal Justices’

Sotomayor or Kagan, who joined the Court in the last two years of the period studied, and did
not participate in the overwhelming majority of the cases in the dataset.
126. See supra Tables 6b–6g. The one noteworthy exception was the conservative Justices’
dueling uses of dictionary definitions; Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Kennedy employed this
interpretive tool very even-handedly, showing almost no ideological slanting.
127. Brudney & Ditslear, Cannons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57–60.
128. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 144 tbl.6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 142–44; Brudney & Ditslear, Cannons of Construction, supra note 5, at 6.
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dueling canon use run exactly opposite to Brudney and Ditslear’s
findings.
But there is an interesting counterpoint to these data. Table 7
reports the correlation between canon and interpretive tool use and
ideology in the Roberts Court’s unanimous statutory cases. The Table
does not contain entries for the individual Justices’ ideological
slanting because, in the unanimous cases, all of the Justices voted the
same way. Thus, the ideological breakdown for each interpretive tool
tells us the rate at which individual Justices invoked that tool to reach
conservative versus liberal outcomes. Interestingly, the Table shows
that for this subset of cases, the Justices tended to use most of the
canons and interpretive tools to support both liberal and conservative
outcomes at generally comparable rates. There were some
exceptions—for example, dictionary definitions and legislative history
tended to be used to support liberal outcomes at much higher rates
than conservative outcomes, and the common law tended to be used
to reach conservative outcomes much more often than liberal ones.
But overall, most canons and tools were used to support conservative
outcomes in roughly 40 percent to 50 percent of the cases and liberal
outcomes in roughly 40 percent to 50 percent of the cases.
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Table 7: Ideology by Canon/Tool in Unanimous Cases
Percent
Conservative

Percent
Liberal

Percent
Neither

Conservative
–Liberal
Differential

Ideology in
Unanimous Cases
(n=115)
40%
53%
7.0%
-13.0%
Text/Plain Meaning†
(n=68)
51.47%
41.17%
7.35%
10.3%
131
Dictionaries
(n=28)
28.57%
60.7%
10.71%
-32.13%
Language / Grammar /
Whole Act Rule
(n=54)
38.89%
53.7%
74.07%
-14.81%
Other Statutes
(n=36)
44.4%
50.0%
5.55%
-5.6%
132
Legislative History
(n=30)
30.0%
56.7%
13.33%
-26.7%
Purpose†
(n=26)
50.0%
38.46%
11.54%
11.54%
Intent
(n=22)
40.9%
50.0%
9.1%
-9.1%
Practical Consequences†
(n=34)
52.94%
38.24%
8.82%
14.7%
Common Law*†
(n=21)
57.14%
28.57%
14.29%
28.57%
Substantive*† Canons
(n=17)
41.2%
47.05%
11.8%
-5.85%
† Denotes that this canon or tool skewed in the opposite ideological direction from the overall
ideological breakdown for unanimous cases (canon/tool tended to lead to conservative case
outcomes, while a majority of unanimous cases had liberal case outcomes).
*Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which this tool
was used to support liberal and conservative outcomes at p<.05. (Except that for substantive
canons, the difference approaches significance at p=.057).

The data reveal that the Justices tended to use at least some of
the canons and tools in a manner that was inconsistent with their
ideological preferences in cases with the highest degree of consensus.
For example, conservative Justices, who used legislative history to
support a conservative outcome in 52.6 percent to 68.4 percent of the

131. Nine of twenty-one liberal dictionary referencing unanimous opinions were authored
by conservative Justices; four of the eight conservative ones were – so not just explained by
liberal Justices authoring the unanimous opinions that used dictionary to reach liberal results.
132. Seven of the seventeen liberal legislative history unanimous opinions were authored by
conservative Justices; two of the nine conservative ones were – so not just explained by liberal
Justices authoring the unanimous opinions that used legislative history to reach liberal results.
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133

dueling canon cases, authored or joined an opinion using legislative
history to support a liberal outcome in 56.7 percent of the
unanimously decided cases. Conversely, liberal Justices, who invoked
statutory purpose to support a liberal outcome in 57.9 percent to 68.4
134
percent of the dueling canon cases, authored or joined an opinion
that employed purpose to reach a conservative outcome in half of the
unanimous cases. For comparison purposes, Table 8 reports the
correlation between opinion author and ideology for all cases.
Table 8: Ideology by Opinion Author

Per Curiam
(n=15)
Scalia
(n=68)
Thomas
(n=68)
Roberts
(n=38)
Alito
(n=52)
Kennedy
(n=44)
Souter
(n=34)
Ginsburg
(n=46)
Breyer
(n=73)
Stevens
(n=60)
Sotomayor
(n=23)
Kagan
(n=7)

Conservative

Liberal

Indeterminate

26.7%

73.3%

0.0%

63.2%

35.3%

1.5%

58.8%

38.2%

3.0%

52.6%

44.7%

2.6%

50.0%

46.2%

3.8%

43.2%

52.3%

4.5%

35.3%

64.7%

0.0%

37.0%

63.0%

0.0%

31.5%

63.0%

5.5%

25.0%

70.0%

5.0%

52.2%

43.5%

4.35%

42.85%

42.85%

14.29%

133. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy’s rate of invoking legislative history to support
conservative outcomes was lower, at 42.1 percent. See supra Table 6a.
134. These figures do not include Justices Souter, Sotomayor, or Kagan, who did not
participate in a substantial number of the cases, and whose rates of reference therefore are not
comparable to those of the other Justices.
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Why the significant difference? Again, causation is difficult to
determine, but there seem to be at least three possible explanations.
On the one hand, perhaps when confronted with a statutory case, the
Justices are looking to the interpretive canons and tools for guidance
in the first instance. When the canons and tools point clearly to a
particular interpretation, perhaps the Justices are reaching high
degrees of consensus and engaging in very little dueling canon use
because the interpretive tools are pointing in a clear direction.
Conversely, when the interpretive tools are indeterminate, that could
be driving the Justices to divide over the correct statutory
construction—and to engage the canons in a dueling manner.
On the other hand, it could be the case that the Justices are
starting with a preferred statutory construction—perhaps based on
ideology, or considerations of practical consequences or equitable
concerns, or some other intuition—and are invoking the interpretive
tools to justify that construction. In other words, the Justices could be
using the canons as “just window-dressing for results reached for
135
other reasons.” If so, the Justices could be dueling more in the
divided-vote cases (when they disagree over the correct statutory
construction) because they are using the canons strategically, with the
distinct purpose of neutralizing an opposing opinion’s arguments.
A third possibility is that the Justices may be doing different
things in different cases. That is, the close-vote-margin cases may be
ones in which the Justices generally are starting with a preferred
construction, perhaps based on ideology, and working backward to
the interpretive tools—making them more prone to find competing
applications for the same tool and to duel in such cases. In the
unanimous cases, by contrast, the order of decisionmaking might be
reversed; that is, these might be cases in which the Justices do not
have strong ideological preferences and might be looking to the
interpretive canons in the first instance for guidance.
Bottom line: the canons and interpretive tools do not seem to be
constraining the Justices to vote against their ideological preferences.
But it also does not seem to be the case that the interpretive canons
and tools are being readily manipulated to support competing
outcomes in the same case, in the manner suggested by Llewellyn’s
famous critique. That is, for most individual interpretive canons and
tools, reliance by a majority opinion is not resulting in a dissenting

135. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 679.
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opinion countering that same canon or tool most of the time (in
roughly 75 percent of the cases). Only the plain meaning rule and
Supreme Court precedent are being used in a dueling manner in a
large percentage of the cases. And, surprisingly, many interpretive
tools that seem highly susceptible to competing invocation—including
legislative history, dictionary definitions, substantive canons, and
statutory purpose—are generating only low levels of dueling (in
136
roughly 25 percent of the relevant cases).
The practical
consequences and other statutes tools exhibit slightly higher rates of
dueling, at 30.9–34.5 percent, but these tools, like Supreme Court
precedent, are traditional tools of legal analysis rather than statutory
interpretation-specific maxims; indeed, the other statutes tool has a
significant precedent component, as it involves analogies to words in
other statutes that have been given a particular construction by courts
in prior cases. Also, importantly for the foundational theories of
statutory interpretation, no individual statutory interpretationspecific tool of interpretation—other than the plain meaning rule—
seems more prone than others to trigger counter-references in the
opposite direction. Some implications of these findings are discussed
below in Part III.
III. DOCTRINAL FINDINGS
A. Inside Story: Patterns of Dueling Canon Use
Llewellyn observed that a court must “take the music of any
statute as written by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as
written by the legislature. But there are many ways to play that music,
137
to play that play . . . .” This Section examines the many ways in
which majority and dissenting opinions play the same interpretive
resource to reach different readings of the same statute. The Section
explores the dueling canon cases by individual canon or interpretive
tool, uncovering some noteworthy patterns in how the Justices duel.
The analysis in this Section is doctrinal rather than empirical, focusing
on understanding how the Justices employ the same tools to reach
opposing statutory constructions rather than on how frequently they
duel over particular tools.

136. See supra Table 1.
137. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 399.
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1. Text / Plain Meaning Rule. My analysis identified three
primary ways that opposing opinions in the same case tend to duel
over application of the plain meaning rule. The majority and
dissenting opinions in the case might:
1. Focus on different words or phrases in the text of the same
statute.
2. Focus on the text of different statutes, where more than one
statute is implicated in the parties’ dispute.
3. Focus on the same word or phrase in a statute, but ascribe
different meaning to that text.
Further, when dueling in the third manner, one opinion might
adopt the prototypical, or core meaning of the term at issue, while the
opposing opinion adopts a more expansive reading of the same term.
Let us consider in turn each form of judicial dueling over the
plain meaning rule.
a. Focus on different words or phrases in the text of the same
statute. When one party alleges that particular conduct gives rise to a
claim under a statutory provision, judges may disagree about which
precise words or phrases in the statute govern the statute’s reach. For
138
example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court
construed a provision of the Patriot Act that makes it a federal crime
to “knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign
139
terrorist organization . . . .” Pursuant to the statute, the Secretary of
State designated the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka as “foreign terrorist
140
organizations.” Some U.S. citizens and domestic organizations who
wished to provide support for the lawful, nonterrorist activities of
these organizations argued that the statute should be read to require
proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist
141
organization’s illegal activities. A majority of the Court disagreed,
focusing on the word “knowingly” and arguing that the statute
requires only knowledge about the organization’s connection to
terrorism, not a specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist
142
activities. The dissenting opinion, by contrast, focused on the words

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 9.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
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“material support” and argued that the statute required the
government to show that the defendant knew his acts were likely to
143
further the organization’s terrorist aims, not just its lawful ones.
b. Focus on the text of two different statutes, where more than one
statute is implicated in the parties’ dispute. This form of dueling over
application of the plain meaning rule does not seem to be very
common, but it did occur in a few Roberts Court cases. In AT&T
144
Corp. v. Hulteen, for example, the majority opinion emphasized the
text of Title VII, while the dissenting opinion focused on the text of
145
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
c. Focus on the same word or phrase in a statute, but ascribe
different meaning to that text. This is the most common, and perhaps
most interesting, form of judicial dueling over plain meaning.
Roughly three-fourths of the cases in which the Justices dueled over
the plain meaning rule involved a disagreement over the meaning of
146
the same word or phrase in the statutory text. In almost half of
those cases, however, something more than simple disagreement was

143. See id. at 57–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Additional examples from outside the dataset
include Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 691–
95, 727–30 (1995) (focusing on the statutory term “harm,” while the dissent focuses on the term
“taking”), and Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128–132,143–48 (1998) (focusing on the
plain meaning of statutory term “carried,” while the dissent focuses on the phrase “carried a
firearm”).
144. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009).
145. Hulteen concerned whether an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) by calculating pension benefits using an accrual rule that gave less retirement credit for
pregnancy leave than for other kinds of medical leave. Id. at 704. The PDA was enacted in 1978
to override a 1976 Supreme Court decision, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which held that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976),
superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982). The Hulteen majority concluded that the employer’s pension policy did not violate the
PDA, relying on a Title VII provision that defines “unlawful employment practice” with respect
to seniority systems. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 707. The majority held that a seniority system violates
Title VII only if it was “adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose” and found that
there could be no “intentional” discrimination in a policy adopted before the PDA was enacted,
while Gilbert supplied the governing legal rule. Id. at 711–14. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
dissented, arguing that the PDA’s plain text unambiguously expressed Congress’s disapproval of
both the holding and reasoning of Gilbert—and made clear that pregnancy-based discrimination
always has constituted sex discrimination. Id. at 720–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. There were forty-three cases in the dataset in which the Court dueled over plain
meaning; thirty-four involved majority and dissenting opinions that ascribed different meaning
to the same statutory word or phrase.
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147

at work. Specifically, the Justices seemed to divide over whether to
adopt the “core” or “prototypical” meaning of the word at issue
versus the “legalist” meaning.
The distinction between “prototypical” and “legalist” meaning is
not new. Linguist Larry Solan brought the concept of “prototypical
meaning” to the attention of statutory interpretation scholars at least
a decade ago, defining it as the meaning that focuses on the “core
example” that the statute was designed to reach, rather than a
meaning that stretches to the conceptual or logical extension of the
148
word at issue. More recent work by Victoria Nourse has highlighted
the distinction between “prototypical meaning” and the latter, logical
149
extension kind of meaning, which she calls “legalist meaning.”
Nourse’s work also demonstrates the significance of the distinction,
observing that “legalist meaning” is the meaning that New Textualists
like Justice Scalia tend to employ, abstracting from the core meaning
and considering all logical possibilities that fit within a statutory
150
term. Both Solan and Nourse urge judges to follow “prototypical”
151
rather than “legalist” meaning when construing statutes.
As noted, the Roberts Court’s first five-plus terms contained a
significant number of cases in which the majority and dissent reached
opposing statutory constructions based on the statute’s prototypical
versus legalist meaning. Consider, for example, the dueling opinions
152
in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons. Ali involved the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the United States’ sovereign
immunity for claims based on torts committed by federal
153
employees. The FTCA contains several exceptions, including one
for “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any . . . property by any
officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement
154
officer . . . .” Ali, a prisoner who was transferred between prisons,
147. Of the thirty-four cases that dueled over the meaning of the same statutory term,
fourteen (41.2 percent) pitted prototypical meaning against legalist meaning.
148. Solan, supra note 18, at 2061.
149. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1000.
150. See id.; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 124–25 (2012) (discussing prototypical vs.
legalist meaning in the context of Professors Vermeule and Chomsky’s debate over legislative
history in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)).
151. Nourse, supra note 18, at 1001–04; Solan, supra note 18, at 2060–62.
152. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
154. Id. § 2680(c).
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noticed that several items of his personal property were missing when
155
he arrived at his new facility. Ali brought an FTCA claim alleging
that Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials lost his property in
transit. The BOP argued that Ali’s claim was barred under the above
exemption.
A majority of the Roberts Court agreed with the BOP, relying
heavily on the plain meaning of the phrase “any other law
enforcement officer,” which it read to confer immunity on all law
156
enforcement officers. The majority argued that “[t]he phrase ‘any
other law enforcement officer’ suggests a broad meaning” and
observed that “[w]e have previously noted that read naturally, the
word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some
157
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” To support its construction, the
majority cited both a dictionary definition and prior cases that gave
expansive meaning to phrases such as “any other term of
158
imprisonment” and “any other final action.” The majority opinion
acknowledged that the statute’s use of the terms “tax or customs
duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” demonstrated Congress’s
focus on preserving immunity for claims arising from an officer’s
enforcement of tax and customs laws. But it emphasized that the text
also explicitly mentions claims arising from the “detention of
property” and insisted that there was no indication that Congress
159
intended immunity to turn on the type of law being enforced. This is
a legalist approach to plain meaning—abstracting out from the
statute’s core application to customs officers, and relying on
broadening interpretive resources such as the dictionary, which
provides definitions detached from statutory context, to aid in this
conceptual expansion. By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting
opinion found that “the plain words of the statute indicate that the
exception is concerned only with customs and taxes” and protects
160
only law enforcement officers who deal with customs and taxes.
Justice Kennedy’s dissent emphasized that property damage resulting
from customs and tax-related forfeitures was the core situation that
the exemption was designed to reach, and faulted the majority for
155. Ali, 552 U.S. at 216.
156. Id. at 218–21.
157. Id. at 218–19 (emphasis omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
158. Id. at 219.
159. Id. at 220–21.
160. Id. at 230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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reading the phrase “detention of property” too broadly and for
focusing on the meaning of the word “any” in isolation, rather than in
162
light of the statutory context.
What is especially interesting about the core-versus-legalistmeaning divide is that it does not necessarily play out along
predictable ideological or jurisprudential lines across cases. For
example, at least in the cases decided during the Roberts Court’s first
five-and-a-half terms, arch-textualist Justice Scalia voted to follow the
statute’s prototypical meaning nearly as often as he did to follow its
163
legalist meaning. Similarly, purposivist jurist Justice Ginsburg voted
nearly as often to adopt a statute’s legalist meaning as she did to
164
adopt its prototypical, or core, meaning. Purposivist Justice Breyer

161. See id. at 235–36 (“[T]he majority of the nine federal statutes other than § 2680(c)
containing a reference to the detention of goods, merchandise, or other property are specific to
customs and excise.”).
162. Id. at 233–35.
163. There were fourteen dueling plain meaning rule cases that divided over prototypicalversus-legalist meaning; in six of these, Justice Scalia voted to adopt the prototypical, core
meaning rather than the legalist meaning. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (Thomas, J.) (finding that the prototypical conduct covered
by SEC’s Rule 10b-5 prohibition against false statements in prospectus is statements made by
entities who have final authority over statements); United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation,
131 S. Ct. 1723, 1728 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) (finding that the core conduct covered by statute’s
jurisdictional bar is Civil War-era cotton claimants who sued the United States in the Court of
Claims, while concurrently suing federal officials in other courts under state tort law); Kawasaki
Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 102–03, 111 (2010) (Kennedy, J.) (finding
that the core meaning of the Carmack Amendment subjects only “receiving rail carrier[s]” and
“delivering rail carrier[s]” to liability and, therefore, property received overseas and later
transported to inland location by rail carriers was not covered); Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S.
505, 524 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the core method of projecting debtor’s
income for Bankruptcy Code purposes is to follow Code’s formula defining “current monthly
income” as “the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives” during the
past six months); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (Scalia, J.) (finding
that the core meaning of National Bank Act is that “visitorial powers” protect national banks
against supervisory powers and actions by states, not against all ordinary enforcement by states);
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that a DUI
offense is not a “violent felony” because the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
covers only offenses similar to the core offenses enumerated in the statute).
164. There were fourteen dueling plain meaning rule cases that divided over prototypicalversus-legalist meaning; in six of these, Justice Ginsburg voted to adopt the legalist meaning
rather than the prototypical meaning. See Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that the “English language” does not impose boundaries on the word
‘make’ and relying on examples external to the securities context); Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct.
at 1739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying legalist focus on the general, detached meaning of
the terms “claim” and “cause of action,” and citing generalist treatise to conclude that
entitlement to relief is an essential component of both terms); Kawasaki, 561 U.S. at 114–15
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (employing a legalist reading of the Carmack Amendment as
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and intentionalist Justice Stevens were more predictable, voting to
adopt a statute’s prototypical meaning in most, though not all, cases.
Justice Thomas was similarly predictable, voting to adopt a statute’s
legalist meaning in most cases, while Justices Roberts, Alito, and
Kennedy were more evenly divided in their use of legalist versus
165
prototypical meaning.
The above doctrinal patterns provide important insight into why
the plain meaning rule does not seem to constrain jurists in the
manner that textualists predict. Justices interpreting statutory text
may find different words, phrases, or provisions within the same
statute to be controlling or, more cynically, may emphasize different
words, phrases, or provisions in order to justify their preferred
statutory constructions. Even when the Justices agree on the precise
text at issue, some may focus on the core situations that text was
designed to cover, while others may seek the general, broad meaning
of the word. None of this tells us directly whether the Justices are
being disingenuous in their use of text/plain meaning in pursuit of
predetermined outcomes, or are simply disagreeing honestly about
the rule’s application. They could be doing either, or both.
Regardless, this doctrinal information teaches that there is ample
room for judicial discretion in identifying the so-called “plain” import
of statutory terms.
At the same time, however, the doctrinal insight about
“prototypical” versus “legalist” meaning suggests a path by which at
least some of the indeterminacy involved in application of the plain
meaning rule might be eliminated, and judicial dueling over this
interpretive canon reduced. Specifically, if jurists were to select either
“legalist” or “core” meaning as the appropriate measuring device for
a statute’s plain meaning, and all Justices sought to identify only that
form of plain meaning in all cases, then at least some uncertainties
about a statute’s meaning could be diminished and judicial dueling

providing liability regime for all rail carriage of property within United States, and citing
generalist maritime treatises); Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2472 (Alito, J.) (referencing broad,
general meaning that “projections” are based on likely future events, not an assumption that the
past will repeat itself); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (Alito, J.) (relying on a
legalist reading of the term “any” to construe the RICO term “enterprise” to cover any group of
individuals associated in fact); Ali, 552 U.S. at 220 (Thomas, J.) (voting with the majority and
finding that the statutory mention of “any” law enforcement covers all law enforcement).
165. Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito voted to adopt the prototypical meaning over the
legalist meaning in five to six cases each, while Justice Thomas did so in only four of fourteen
cases.
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over this interpretive canon could be reduced appreciably—perhaps
by as much as one-third.
2. Whole Act Rule. As with the plain meaning rule, there are a
number of ways in which the members of the Roberts Court tend to
duel over application of the whole act rule:
1. In some cases, the majority and dissenting opinions apply
different subparts of the whole act rule to the same statutory
provision.
2. In others, the majority and dissenting opinions focus on
different subparts of the statute at issue.
3. In still other cases, opposing opinions focus on the same
subpart of the whole act rule, but reach different end results.
a. Apply different subparts of the whole act rule to the same
statutory provision. This form of dueling whole act rule use is perhaps
most akin to the “thrusts and parries” in Llewellyn’s famous list, as it
involves one canonical maxim canceling out another. A majority
opinion, for example, might invoke the “meaningful variation”
subpart of the whole act rule, which holds that when Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same statute, courts should presume that
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion; while the dissenting opinion might invoke the
“consistent usage” rule, which presumes that statutory terms mean
the same thing throughout all provisions of a statute. Consider the
166
2009 case, Carcieri v. Salazar. Carcieri involved construction of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), which authorizes the
Secretary of Interior to acquire land and hold it in trust “for the
167
purpose of providing land for Indians.” The Act defines “Indian” to
“include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
168
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” At the
time the IRA was enacted, federal authorities considered a tribe
called the Narragansett to be under state, rather than federal,
jurisdiction and refused to provide it with federal assistance. The
Narragansett Tribe did not gain formal recognition from the federal

166. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
167. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 985 (1934) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 465 (2012)).
168. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012).
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169

Several years later, a dispute arose
government until 1983.
regarding land that the Tribe had purchased. While litigation was
pending, the Secretary notified the State of Rhode Island that he
170
intended to accept the disputed land into trust. Rhode Island
challenged the Secretary’s authority to accept the land into trust,
arguing that the statutory term “now” refers to the time of the IRA’s
enactment, and permits the Secretary to take land into trust only for
171
recognized tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934.
A majority of the Court agreed with the State’s construction.
Among other canons, the majority opinion invoked the whole act rule
“meaningful variation” principle, noting that other sections of the
IRA refer to “now or hereafter,” and arguing that this shows that
Congress knows how to draw both contemporaneous and future
events into a statute when it wants to, and that its failure to include
“or hereafter” in the provision at issue means that only tribes
recognized at the time of the IRA’s enactment come under the
172
provision. The dissenting opinion, by contrast, invoked a different
whole act rule subpart, the “consistent usage” rule, and different
statutory text. It observed that the majority’s construction works only
if one reads the term “Indians” to refer to individuals, not an Indian
173
tribe. And it noted that Congress has used “Indians” and “Indian
tribe” interchangeably in other parts of the IRA, and that the
consistent usage rule dictates that Congress should be understood to
174
have done the same in this provision of the IRA as well.
b. The majority and dissenting opinions focus on different
subparts of the statute at issue. This form of dueling over application
of the whole act rule can involve application of the same whole act
rule subpart to different statutory provisions, or can involve two
different subparts of the whole act rule applied to two different
175
statutory provisions. Begay v. United States provides a good
example of the first form of whole act rule dueling. Begay raised the
question whether driving under the influence of alcohol is a “violent
felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The majority held
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 389–90 (construing 25 U.S.C. § 472).
Id. at 409–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
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that a DUI does not constitute a “violent felony,” relying significantly
on a whole act “rule against superfluity” argument that compared the
first and second clauses of § 924(e)(2)(B) and noted that if “violent
felony” meant all risky crimes, there would be no need for Congress
to include specific examples of crimes such as burglary and arson in
the second clause—the examples would be superfluous and would
render the first clause, which covers the use of physical force,
176
superfluous. The dissent also made a whole act rule superfluity
argument, but based on a different statutory provision—
§ 924(e)(2)(A), which includes offenses that “have as an element the
177
use or threatened use of violence.” The dissent maintained that this
subparagraph shows that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is not limited to “violent”
crimes because, if it were, it would be redundant, covering the exact
178
same ground as § 924(e)(2)(A).
c. Opposing opinions apply the same subpart of the whole act rule,
but reach different end results. This form of dueling over application
of the whole act rule is similar to the third form of plain meaning
dueling, in which the majority and dissenting opinions take different
views about what constitutes the “plain” meaning of the same
statutory text. It suggests that judicial application of the canons
suffers not merely from a “cherry-picking” problem, whereby judges
have substantial discretion to decide which canons or tools to apply
and which precise statutory terms and provisions to focus on, but that
even when judges agree on the precise tool to apply and the precise
terms or provisions of the statute at issue, there is substantial room
for disagreement about the interpretive conclusion to be drawn. In
other words, this form of dueling canon use suggests that it is not just
the exceptions and countercanons that can render the tools of
statutory interpretation indeterminate; but, rather, that the canons
and interpretive tools themselves are fairly open to interpretive
license.

176. Id. at 147–48; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (defining violent felony to mean
“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “(i) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).
177. Begay, 553 U.S. at 160 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)).
178. Id. at 159–60.
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The Court’s dueling statutory-structure inferences in Dean v.
179
United States provide a good example. Dean involved a sentencingenhancement statute that contained three subparts: the first imposes a
five-year mandatory-minimum enhancement if a firearm is used or
carried during and in relation to a violent crime, the second increases
the enhancement to seven years “if the firearm is brandished,” and
the third increases the enhancement to ten years “if the firearm is
180
discharged.”
At issue was whether the ten-year mandatory
enhancement applies if the gun was discharged accidentally, or
whether there is an intent requirement for the ten-year enhancement.
A majority of the Court interpreted the statute not to contain an
intent requirement, relying significantly on the whole act rule
“meaningful variation” and “holistic endeavor” subparts. The
majority opinion pointed to the “is brandished” provision
immediately preceding the “is discharged” provision and noted that it
expressly includes an intent requirement, because the brandishing
181
must be done “in order to intimidate.” It concluded that Congress’s
failure to include a similar intent requirement in the “is discharged”
182
provision should be viewed as intentional and deliberate. Justice
Stevens’ dissenting opinion also relied heavily on the whole act rule
“holistic endeavor” subpart; but in contrast to the majority, it read
the three enhancements clauses, taken as a whole, to provide
183
escalating mandatory sentences for increasingly culpable conduct.
Based on this statutory structure, it drew a different conclusion from
the intent requirement in the “is brandished” provision—reading it to
mean that the “is discharged” clause also must contain an intent
requirement because unintentional discharges are less culpable than
intentional brandishing, and it would be nonsensical for clause (iii) to
impose a higher sentence for conduct less culpable than that
184
described in clause (ii).
The multiple ways in which the Justices duel over application of
the whole act rule are instructive. They reveal that majority–
dissenting dueling is not necessarily a simple canon-for-countercanon
affair. The Justices disagree not just over the applicable legal rule, but

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
See id. at 570 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)).
Id. at 572–73 (emphasis omitted) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4)).
Id. at 573.
Id. at 578–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579.
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also over which parts of the statute are relevant to the interpretive
question at issue. These doctrinal observations show that Justices
seeking to counteract an opposing opinion’s whole act rule argument
will have many avenues available for crafting a dueling “parry.”
Indeed, given the evidence that federal statutes increasingly are
drafted by multiple committees, with different sections pieced
together in a hurried fashion—rather than carefully planned out by
one drafter attentive to how different subparts interact—it is almost
surprising that we do not see more judicial dueling over this
interpretive tool.
3. Statutory Purpose. Again, there were a number of ways in
which the members of the Roberts Court dueled over the proper
application of statutory purpose in the majority and dissenting
opinions in the same case. The primary patterns I observed were:
1. Majority and dissenting opinions focus on different,
sometimes competing, statutory purposes.
2. Majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same statutory
purpose, but draw different conclusions about how that
purpose should impact their construction of the statute.
3. Related to the first, majority or dissenting opinion focuses
on a broad, general statutory purpose, while the opposing
opinion focuses on a narrow or specific purpose of the statute.
a. Majority and dissenting opinions focus on different, sometimes
competing, statutory purposes. This form of dueling over statutory
purpose is, I think, what Justice Scalia has in mind when he argues
that interpreting statutes based on purpose leaves too much
discretion to individual judges. Justice Scalia has, for example, noted
that every statute has multiple purposes and that “[n]o legislation
185
pursues its purposes at all costs” —meaning that the limitations and
compromises enacted into a statute are as much a part of its purpose
186
as are its broad goals.
185. Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2044 (2012) (quoting Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)).
186. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 183–84 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is naïve for the Court to rely on guesses as to what Congress would
have wanted in legislation as complicated as this, the culmination of a long, drawn-out
legislative battle in which” interested parties attempted to pull the provisions in different
directions); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Deduction from the ‘broad purpose’ of a statute begs the question if it
is used to decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress pursued that purpose.”);
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The competing-purposes form of dueling occurred in fourteen of
187
nineteen dueling purpose cases. A good example is Conkright v.
188
Frommert, an ERISA case that raised the question whether courts
must defer to subsequent interpretations made by a plan
administrator whose initial interpretation of a benefits plan was
189
deemed “unreasonable” by a court. The majority opinion held that
deference remained appropriate, relying in part on ERISA’s statutory
purpose of balancing the need to “ensur[e] fair and prompt
enforcement of rights” with the need to “encourag[e] the creation of
190
such plans” by employers. The dissenting opinion, by contrast,
construed the statute to allow more searching judicial review where a
plan administrator’s first interpretation was unfair to employees,
arguing that this construction is most consistent with ERISA’s “core
purpose of promot[ing] the interests of employees and their
191
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”
b. Majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same statutory
purpose, but draw different conclusions about how that purpose should
impact their construction of the statute. As with the “plain meaning”
rule and the whole act rule, this form of dueling over the same,
agreed-upon statutory purpose suggests an inherent looseness in
translating statutory purpose into statutory construction, as opposed
to mere judicial discretion in choosing among different versions of a
canon or tool. That is, it suggests an “inherent indeterminacy,” rather
than merely a “cherry-picking” problem in the use of interpretive
tools.

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The number of
possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.”); see also Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J.) (“[The statute’s] delicate crafting
reflected a compromise amidst highly interested parties attempting to pull the provisions in
different directions.”); City of Joliet v. New West, L.P., 562 F.3d 830, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2009)
(Easterbrook, C.J.) (stating that when courts look to purpose, “judges become effective
lawmakers, bypassing the give-and-take of the legislative process”).
187. See infra Appendix for dueling purpose cases. The five cases in which the Court dueled
without invoking different statutory purposes were: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011); Jerman v. Carlisle, 559 U.S. 573 (2010); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70
(2008); Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v.
Zurich Am. Ins., 547 U.S. 651 (2006).
188. Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010).
189. Id. at 509–11.
190. Id. at 517 (citations omitted). The majority noted several ways in which deference
would benefit employers. Id.
191. Id. at 535–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The Court’s opinions in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
192
Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A. provide a good illustration. Jerman
involved construction of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
which prohibits debt collectors from making false representations to
193
debtors about a debt’s character, amount, or legal status. The Act
contains an exception if a debt collector can show that its violation
194
“was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error.” At issue
was whether a law firm that filed a lawsuit on behalf of a mortgage
company mistakenly seeking to foreclose on property owned by
195
Jerman qualified for the bona fide error exception. A majority of
the Court concluded that the bona fide error defense does not apply
to violations that result from a debt collector’s mistaken
196
interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA. In so ruling,
the Court cited the statute’s purpose of “eliminat[ing] abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors [and] insur[ing] that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are
not competitively disadvantaged” and argued “that immunizing debt
collectors who adopt aggressive but mistaken interpretations of the
law would be inconsistent with the statute’s broadly worded
197
prohibitions on debt collector misconduct.” The dissenting opinion
quoted the same statutory purpose, but concluded that when referring
to “abusive debt collection practices” Congress “surely did not
contemplate attorneys who act based on reasonable, albeit ultimately
mistaken legal interpretations” and noted that debt collectors do not
198
gain a competitive advantage by making good-faith legal errors.
c. Majority or dissenting opinion focuses on a broad, general
statutory purpose, while the opposing opinion focuses on a narrow, or
specific purpose of the statute. This form of dueling over statutory
purpose also may be one that Justice Scalia has in mind when he
criticizes purpose-based statutory interpretation. It is a standard
textualist complaint that by framing the statutory purpose at whatever

192. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (2010).
193. Id. at 576; see Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2012)).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012).
195. Jerman, 559 U.S. at 579. The debt had already been paid, but the complaint contained a
notice stating that the debt would be assumed valid unless Jerman disputed it in writing. Id.
196. Id. at 581–82.
197. Id. at 602.
198. Id. at 619 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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level of abstraction she wishes, a judge can reach the interpretive
199
outcome that she prefers.
200
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. provides a good
example of this form of dueling over statutory purpose. In Ledbetter,
a female retiree sued her former employer under Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act, alleging that poor performance evaluations she
received as a result of sex-based discrimination early in her tenure
resulted in her receiving lower pay than her male colleagues from the
201
time of the evaluations through the end of her career. Goodyear
argued that Ledbetter’s claims were time-barred under a Title VII
provision requiring that individuals who wish to bring a
discriminatory pay lawsuit must file a charge with the EEOC within
180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
202
occurred.” Ledbetter countered that her claims were timely because
each unequal paycheck she received constituted a new Title VII
violation and gave her an additional 180 days to file an EEOC
203
charge. A majority of the Court disagreed, concluding that the later
effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an
204
EEOC charge. The majority opinion relied in part on the narrow,
specific purpose of the time limitation, noting that statutes of
205
limitations serve a “policy of repose.” The dissenting opinion, by
contrast, focused on Title VII’s broad, general purpose of “assur[ing]
equality of employment opportunities” and “mak[ing] persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
206
discrimination.”
The dissent also criticized the majority’s

199. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2010–11 (2006) (arguing that “legislators . . . rely on semantic detail to
express the level of generality at which a proposed legislative policy is acceptable to them” and
that judges ignore the “untidy compromise[s]” designed to check a statute’s reach when they
engage in purposivist analysis); Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation,
43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1185, 1196–97 (2011) (noting that Justice Scalia has made this point).
200. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
201. Id. at 621–22.
202. Id. at 623–624 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012))).
203. Id. at 624.
204. Id. at 628–29.
205. Id. at 630.
206. Id. at 660–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 328 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
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construction as “totally at odds with the robust protection against
207
workplace discrimination Congress intended Title VII to secure.”
4. Practical Consequences. Finally, many of the Roberts Court’s
statutory cases contain dueling assessments of the practical
consequences that are likely to flow from adopting a particular
interpretation. Within this subset of dueling opinions, one pattern or
divide is prominent: in 61.3 percent of the cases, one opinion makes
an “administrability” argument, while the opposing opinion makes a
208
“policy constancy” argument. In an earlier empirical study of the
207. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661. Another good example of majority–dissent dueling over
general versus specific purpose can be found in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama
Department of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101 (2011), where the majority opinion relied on a tax
statute’s broad purpose of restoring financial stability to railroads, id. at 280, while the dissent
referenced the more specific statutory purpose of preventing states from discriminating against
railroads, id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208. This was true in nineteen of thirty-one cases. See Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2045, 2049, 2053 (2011) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would undermine another
section of the statute [policy constancy] while dissent argues that majority’s reading adopts a
standard that will confuse judges and juries [administrability]); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S.
320, 332–33, 355 (2010) (majority makes an absurd results argument [policy constancy], while
dissent argues waste of prosecutorial resources [administrability]); Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd.
v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 109–10, 137 (2010) (majority argues that rejected
interpretation would be unworkable, leading to two different sets of rules depending on where
shipping damage occurred [administrability], while dissent emphasizes unfair advantage to some
carriers created by majority’s reading [policy constancy]); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557
U.S. 167, 179, 191–92 (2009) (majority argues that rejected burden-shifting framework has
proved difficult to apply in practice [administrability], while Justice Breyer’s dissent argues that
burden-shifting framework makes more sense because it would otherwise be practically
impossible for plaintiffs to prove statutory violations [policy constancy]); Harbison v. Bell, 556
U.S. 180, 193–94, 204 (2009) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would lead to
unworkable waste of resources, forcing defendants to get both state and federal counsel
[administrability], while dissent argues that majority’s interpretation will lead to absurd results
and gamesmanship [policy constancy]); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 65, 76 (2009)
(majority argues that rejected reading would create procedural mess [administrability], while
dissent argues that majority’s reading unjustly produces different results for parties with
identical claims [policy constancy]); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17, 40 (2009) (plurality
argues unworkability [administrability], while dissent argues consistency with statute’s goals and
avoidance of absurd results [policy constancy]); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 425–26,
436 (2009) (majority argues that rejected interpretation would make provision at issue
inapplicable in most cases [policy constancy], while dissent argues that majority’s reading makes
statute difficult to administer, requiring elaborate fact-finding [administrability]); Greenlaw v.
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 251–52, 256 (2008) (majority makes an absurd results argument
[policy constancy], while dissent makes a judicial resources argument [administrability]); United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 528, 530 (2008) (concurrence argues that rejected interpretation
would lead to perverse, unthinkable results [policy constancy], while dissent argues that proof
problems will plague implementation of concurrence / majority reading [administrability]);
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383, 398–99 (2008) (majority claims rejected
interpretation could lead to defendants receiving more than the maximum federal sentence
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Roberts Court’s statutory interpretation practices, I described the
“administrability” form of practical consequences as encompassing
discussions about the practical difficulty of implementing the
particular interpretation, the likely effect the interpretation will have
on judicial or other public resources, the consistency or lack of
consistency between federal and state laws created by the
interpretation, and the clarity or predictability of the legal rule or
209
landscape going forward in light of the interpretation. The “policy
constancy” form of practical consequences, by contrast, includes
discussions about inconsistencies in statutory policy likely to result
from a particular interpretation, the equity or justness of the
interpretation, the likelihood that the interpretation will render the
statutory provision “meaningless” or ineffective, and assertions that
logical absurdities or statutory incoherence will result from the
210
interpretation.
There are many examples of majority–dissent division over
administrability versus policy-constancy concerns. In Gonzalez v.
211
United States, the Court considered whether the Federal Magistrate

[policy constancy], while dissent argues that majority’s construction leads to lack of uniformity
across states [administrability]); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50, 265 (2008)
(majority argues that adversary process could not function effectively under rejected
construction [administrability], while dissent makes an absurd results argument [policy
constancy]); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 404, 420 (2008) (majority argues
that rejected interpretation is “illogical and impractical” [policy constancy], while dissent argues
that majority’s reading leaves legal rule vague and unsettled [administrability]); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 211–12, 216–17 (2007) (majority references Congress’s institutional
competence to decide statute of limitations parameters [administrability], while dissent
references harshness of majority’s result [policy constancy]); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch.
Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531, 542–43 (2007) (majority argues unfairness of treating procedural and
substantive claims differently [policy constancy], while dissent argues that its construction
conserves judicial resources and limits frivolous claims [administrability]); Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 11, 31–32 (2007) (majority emphasizes structural concerns – history of national
bank immunity to state regulation [administrability], while dissent argues fairness [policy
constancy]); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336, 342–43 (2007) (majority cautions against
interpretation that would encourage certiorari filings as a delay tactic [administrability], while
dissent counters that majority’s reading will produce absurd results [policy constancy]);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89, 115–16 (2006) (majority emphasizes burden that prisoner
suits place on judicial system [administrability], while dissent criticizes majority’s reading as too
absolute [policy constancy]); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721–22, 772, 806 (2006)
(plurality emphasizes administrative costs and delays associated with permit process
[administrability], while concurrence and dissent argue that plurality’s reading produces
inconsistent consequences [policy constancy]).
209. Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 244–45.
210. Id. at 245–46.
211. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008).
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Act empowers magistrate judges to preside over the voir dire and
selection of prospective jurors in a felony criminal trial based on the
consent of defense counsel, or whether the Act requires the personal
212
consent of the defendant for magistrate supervision. A majority of
the Court read the FMA to allow magistrate supervision based on
213
defense counsel consent alone.
In so ruling, the majority
emphasized the practical necessity of giving defense counsel control
214
over trial-management matters—an “administrability” argument.
“The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical
215
The dissenting opinion
decision required client approval.”
countered with a “policy constancy” absurd results argument, noting
that the statute requires defendant’s express, informed consent in
order for a magistrate judge to conduct a misdemeanor trial and
calling it a “glaring” inconsistency to read the statute to require
greater consent for defendant’s waiver of rights in a misdemeanor
216
case than in a felony case.
In earlier work, I described how the “administrability” versus
“policy constancy” divide reflects a deeper jurisprudential divide
between the Justices over the kind of coherence that jurists should
217
prioritize when construing statutes; the fact that this divide shows
up prominently in the dueling practical consequences cases is
intriguing, and its implications are explored further in Part III of this
Article.
B. Other Observations
Last, let us turn to judicial dueling over dictionary definitions
and legislative history. No noteworthy patterns were found regarding
how the Justices dueled over either of these interpretive tools.
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing doctrinal trends in the cases
involving dueling over these tools because, as noted earlier, the low
level of dueling for these tools was so surprising.

212. Id. at 243.
213. Id. at 245.
214. Id. at 249.
215. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988)).
216. Id. at 262–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 542–43
(majority making policy-constancy injustice argument about allowing parents to sue pro se to
enforce IDEA; part-concurring, part-dissenting opinion counters with administrability argument
that pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts, schools, and school districts).
217. See Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 244–45.
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1. Dictionary Definitions. Two things stand out when one
examines the dueling dictionary cases. First, in most of the cases,
majority and dissenting opinions dueled over different definitions of
218
the same word, as one would expect. However, in a nontrivial
minority of the cases, opposing opinions dueled over the dictionary
219
definitions for different words. This parallels the manner in which
the Justices sometimes dueled over the plain meaning of different
220
statutory words and phrases.
Second, when the Justices did duel over dictionary definitions,
they rarely placed significant weight on such definitions as an
interpretive aid. Of the more than thirty-two opinions in the sixteen
cases that involved dueling dictionary definitions, the vast majority
referenced such definitions in a corroborative manner, to note that
they pointed in the same direction as other interpretive tools. Some
opinions even referenced dictionary definitions only to note that they
were not particularly helpful in construing the statute. Only six
opinions seemed to use the dictionary in a manner that was
dispositive, or that significantly directed the interpretive outcome—
221
all but one of these was authored by Justice Scalia or Justice Alito.
These findings are consistent with a recent empirical study about the
Supreme Court’s dictionary use, which found that the bulk of the
Court’s dictionary references employed the dictionary in an
“ornamental role”—rather than as a primary aid in identifying the

218. This was true in eleven of the sixteen cases in which the Justices dueled over dictionary
definitions. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659–60, 1668 (2011); New Process Steel,
L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 683, 692 (2010); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 587, 613 (2010); Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 287, 304 (2010); Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557 U.S.
519, 526, 539–40 (2009); Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946, 952–53 (2009); Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428, 441 (2009) (counting “injunction” and “enjoin” as the same word);
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511, 531–32 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
144, 151, 156 (2008); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667–68,
692 n.12 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–33, 769–70, 801 (2006).
219. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331–32, 1337 (2011)
(dueling over “filed” v. “complaint”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–32, 251
(2011) (“even though” v. “unavoidable”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228, 237
(2008) (“any” v. “detention” and “bailment”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 207, 213–14
(2007) (“potential” v. “otherwise”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 632, 639, 711 (2006)
(“constituted” v. “special”).
220. See supra Part III.A.1 (noting a pattern that majority and dissenting opinions
sometimes “[f]ocus on different words or phrases in the text of the same statute”).
221. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946 (Alito, J.); Nken, 556 U.S. at 441, 444 (Alito., J., dissenting);
Begay, 553 U.S. at 156 (Alito, J., dissenting); James, 550 U.S. at 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 667–68 (Alito, J.); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732–33 (Scalia, J.).
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best interpretation—and that when the Court did use dictionary
definitions in a dispositive manner, it was almost exclusively in an
222
opinion authored by one of the conservative Justices.
These findings also suggest an explanation for the Court’s low
overall rate of dueling over dictionary definitions, despite the
abundance of dictionaries and definitions within those dictionaries.
Perhaps, when confronted with an opinion that employs a dictionary
definition in an “ornamental” or corroborative fashion, the Justices
writing in opposition do not feel compelled to invoke a countervailing
dictionary definition to undermine the first opinion’s reasoning. That
is, perhaps dueling over dictionary definitions does not seem worth
the effort to the Justices because the dictionary definition does not
seem to add much to their opponent’s statutory construction—so that
providing a dueling definition conversely would not subtract much
from the opposing construction.
2. Legislative History. With respect to legislative history, I
examined the dueling cases for patterns such as one opinion that
relied on legislative history countered by another that used legislative
history merely to corroborate, or one opinion that focused on the
evolution of the statute countered by another that invoked statements
from the legislative record. But no such patterns emerged. Instead,
most of the dueling legislative history cases involved majority and
dissenting opinions that relied on different pieces of legislative history,
such as a conference report versus a rejected proposal, or floor
223
statements versus committee reports, and so on. Only a handful of
the cases even arguably involved majority and dissent dueling over
224
the meaning of the same form of legislative history. Thus, when the
Justices dueled over legislative history, they typically did so in the
“cocktail party” or “something for everyone” manner that textualists
decry.
222. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 67, at 493, 540, 548 n.229, 554 n.273, 569–73.
223. Thirteen of nineteen cases containing dueling references to legislative history involved
majority and dissenting references to different forms of legislative history.
224. Only six of nineteen cases could be said to fall into this category. See AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749, 1757 (2011) (H. Rep. v. H. Rep., floor and hearing
statements); Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 240–42, 254–55 (H. Rep. v. H. Rep.); Carr v. U.S., 130 S. Ct.
2229, 2241, 2249 (2010) (H. Rep and evolution v. H. Rep.); Graham Cty. Soil & Water
Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 296, 308 (2010) (evolution and H. Rep.,
S. Rep. v. evolution); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 713, 718 (2008) (H. Rep v. H. Rep.
and statutory evolution); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578–80, 665 (evolution, rejected proposal, floor
statements v. floor statements).
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Further, in contrast to the Justices’ largely “ornamental” use of
dictionary definitions, the overwhelming majority of the dueling
legislative history cases involved at least one opinion that relied on
legislative history to reach its chosen construction, rather than merely
to corroborate a construction arrived at through other interpretive
tools. Half of the cases involved both majority and dissenting opinions
that relied on legislative history. These data might lead one to
hypothesize that the low overall rate of judicial dueling results from
judicial disinclination to duel in cases where legislative history is used
only to corroborate a statute’s meaning; that is, perhaps most of the
Roberts Court opinions that employ legislative history do so in a
corroborative manner—and perhaps the Justices who author
opposing opinions in those cases do not consider it necessary to
counteract such secondary interpretive references. I explored this
possibility, but the data were not consistent with such an
explanation—most of the opinions in the study that referenced
legislative history relied on such history, rather than used it in a
corroborative manner, yet in the vast majority of those cases
opposing opinions did not make competing legislative history
225
references.
I also reviewed the dueling legislative history cases to determine
whether they involved “smoking-gun” pieces of legislative history
that seemed to address the precise interpretive question at issue—
perhaps explaining why these particular cases triggered a response of
some kind in the opposing opinion. I found, however, that “smokinggun” pieces of legislative history were rare and referenced in only a
226
few of the dueling cases.
Finally, in order to test the possibility that competing legislative
history arguments may not have been available in many of the cases
in which one opinion referenced legislative history, but the opposing
opinion(s) did not, I examined the briefs in fifty-four of the fifty-six
cases in the dataset in which only one opinion cited legislative

225. Of the 528 opinions in the dataset, 137 referenced legislative history. Eighty-four of
these relied on that legislative history, while fifty-three used legislative history to corroborate an
interpretation reached primarily through other tools. Only nineteen of the eighty-four reliance
cases, however, involved judicial dueling over this interpretive tool. See supra Table 1; infra
Appendix.
226. In my view, the following are the only cases in the dataset in which the legislative
history referenced by the Court could be considered of the “smoking-gun” variety: Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318
(2009); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578–80.
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227

history. I found that in forty-eight of these cases (88.9 percent), at
least one brief supporting the reading opposed by the legislativehistory-citing opinion contained competing legislative history
228
references. So the textualist claim that some argument from
legislative history can be manufactured to support almost any reading
does seem to hold true, although this does not seem to be translating
into judicial manipulation of the legislative history in the manner that
textualists predict.
***
Overall, the above patterns of dueling interpretive tool use show
that there are numerous ways in which judges may disagree over the
application of a particular interpretive resource or canon. There are
not simply canons and countercanons, as Llewellyn pointed out, and
there is not only a cherry-picking problem as Bill Eskridge has
229
pointed out. Rather, even when judges use the same interpretive
tool, they may disagree about the statutory word, phrase, provision,
or subpart to which that tool should be applied; they might draw
competing inferences using the same canon or interpretive rule, or
they might bring different focuses (general versus specific) when
applying an interpretive tool. All of this amounts to significant
judicial discretion in the application of particular interpretive tools
and canons. Indeed, when viewed in light of all the possible ways the
canons could be used in a dueling manner, it is surprising that the
Court does not show higher rates of dueling use for most statutoryinterpretation-specific tools.
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The data reported in Part II have important implications for
several prominent theories of statutory interpretation. The
implications are greatest for interpretive theories that emphasize
predictability or that seek to constrain judicial discretion, but theories
that rely on other justifications also can benefit from—or be
undermined by—this study’s findings. This Part explores the
theoretical upshot of the Roberts Court’s dueling canon practices. It
argues that the dueling canon data undermine several normative
227. Briefs were not available online for two of these cases.
228. Most of these references were contained in the main or reply brief for the party; some
were contained in an amicus brief.
229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 534–35 (2013) (book review).
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230

claims made by textualists, calling into question key justifications
that theory offers for privileging certain interpretive tools over others.
At the same time, however, the data do not provide any particular
support for textualism’s chief competitor theory, purposivism. The
data do lend some support, at least descriptively, to pragmatic
theories of statutory interpretation—highlighting the significant role
that practical reasoning plays in the Court’s decisions and divisions.
The Part concludes by discussing what the dueling canon data might
instruct about the viability of methodological stare decisis—the
suggestion that federal courts should adopt a binding statutory
interpretation methodology.
A. Textualism
Textualism is a formalist method of statutory interpretation that
seeks answers primarily from the official language of the statute. It
directs judges to identify the ordinary meaning, at the time of
231
enactment, of the statutory term in question. It prioritizes clarity
232
and predictability and is founded on a belief that there is one
correct, definitive answer to every interpretive question. Textualism
233
treats the interpretive process like a puzzle; if the correct answer
cannot be found through a plain reading of the text, then the
230. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17–22, 132; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxviii–xxix, 18–19 (2012)
(arguing that the textualist approach will produce greater certainty and less variation in the
law—“The most destructive (and most alluring) feature of purposivism is its manipulability”—
as well as that purposivism is unpredictable and five different judges are likely to have five
different ideas about a particular statute’s purpose); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (arguing
that intent obfuscates the law and is less clear than textual meaning); Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (arguing that textualism leads to
predictability and clarity of statutory meaning).
231. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 548 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17; John F. Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2397–98 (2003); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and
the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 416
(1992); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1997).
232. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 230, at xxix, xxii–xxvi.
233. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 354, 372 (1994) (describing textualists’ puzzle-solving approach); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779 (1995) (observing that a textualist judge’s
interpretive process is analogous to solving a puzzle); see also Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency
Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1257 (1996)
(noting textualists’ conviction and certainty about their method).
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dictionary, the statute’s structure, and the Court’s prior
interpretations of the same word or phrase in other statutes should be
consulted to decipher the statute’s meaning. Textualists trust such
bounded interpretive aids to lead courts to the proper statutory
construction—and to restrict the opportunity for “strong-willed
judges to substitute their own personal political views for those of the
234
legislature.”
Related to its emphasis on predictability and judicial constraint,
textualism fervently rejects judicial inquiry into legislative history,
235
intent, and statutory purpose. Textualists have articulated numerous
objections to these interpretive sources, particularly legislative
history. Formally, they point out that only the statutory text is law
and that statements in the legislative record about statutory purpose
or the meaning of particular words have not been enacted following
the bicameralism and presentment requirements articulated in Article
236
I, Section 7. Textualists also challenge the concept of collective
intent, noting that legislative history usually is created by
congressional staffers or, at best, a few legislators—so it does not
237
represent the views of the legislature as a whole. Most relevantly for
a study of dueling canons, textualists argue that judges use legislative
history and statutory purpose selectively, picking and choosing
statements or statutory objectives that support constructions that
238
align with their personal policy preferences. As Justice Scalia has
commented, “In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history
239
is extensive, and there is something for everybody.” In this vein,
textualists are fond of invoking Judge Harold Leventhal’s famous
quip that using legislative history is like going to a cocktail party, and
240
“look[ing] over the heads of the crowd to pick out your friends.”
The dueling canon data pose some serious problems for the
textualist account. First, the data undermine textualism’s central
234. Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302,
1320 (1991) (book review).
235. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 27, at 16−18, 23, 25 (“[O]f course it’s formalistic! The rule
of law is about form.”(emphases omitted)).
236. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; SCALIA, supra note 27, at 35.
237. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7−8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring);
SCALIA, supra note 27, at 16−23.
238. See Pierce, supra note 233, at 751; see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 205–06 (1983).
239. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 36.
240. See, e.g., id.; Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
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claim that text-based analysis constrains judicial decision-making and
241
leads jurists to one correct result. Most notably, the high rate of
majority–dissent dueling over the plain meaning of statutory text—
over 40 percent—indicates that the Justices are not finding textual
analysis particularly clarifying or determinative of one correct answer.
Further, the data in Table 6f, reporting the ideological direction of
the Justices’ votes in the text/plain meaning dueling cases, suggest
that the plain meaning rule is not constraining the Justices
242
ideologically either. Second, the data also undermine textualism’s
claim that interpretive tools such as legislative history, purpose, and
intent are inherently more indeterminate or manipulable than
243
textualism’s favored tools. There is no evidence, for example, that
statutory purpose, legislative history, or intent is particularly
susceptible to dueling use. Table 1 reports low overall levels of
244
dueling for each of these interpretive tools—at or near 25 percent.
More importantly, these purposivist tools exhibited rates of dueling
that were roughly equal to some of textualism’s most favored tools—
e.g., language canons/whole act rule and dictionary references—and
exhibited lower rates of dueling than other textualism-favored tools,
245
such as the plain meaning rule and other statutes.
Textualists might counter that the low rates of dueling over
purpose, legislative history, and intent reflect the fact that some
Justices—particularly those who follow a textualist methodology—
refuse to reference these interpretive tools as a matter of principle.
Thus, even where competing applications of these three interpretive
tools exist, they may not be invoked in a dueling manner in cases
authored by these Justices. If this is true, the argument might
continue, then the dueling rates for these tools could be dampened—
and therefore should be taken not as evidence that the purposivist
tools are not manipulable or indeterminate, but merely as evidence
241. Textualists may argue that the “dueling text” cases in the dataset contain one opinion
that correctly construes the statute paired with an opposing opinion that incorrectly construes
the statute—that is, the “dueling text” cases reveal corrupt applications of the textualist
approach, rather than two correct, competing textualist constructions. Even if we accept this
argument at face value, however, it means that the textualist-preferred interpretive tools are
highly susceptible to judicial manipulation and can be made to appear to support the
construction favored by the judge in a large percentage of the cases, precisely the charge
textualists have leveled at the purposivist interpretive tools.
242. See supra Table 6f.
243. See supra Table 6f.
244. See supra Table 1.
245. See supra Table 1.
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that these tools are not popular, or widely accepted interpretive
resources.
There is some surface appeal to this critique, as the overall
reference rates for individual Justices show that Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Roberts rarely invoked purpose, legislative history, or
246
intent in the statutory opinions they authored. For a number of
reasons, however, I do not believe that this factor can sufficiently
explain the low rate of judicial dueling over the purposivist tools or
reconcile the lack of more significant dueling with the traditional
textualist critique of these interpretive tools. First, Justice Roberts
has not expressed a philosophical opposition to citing legislative
history, statutory purpose, or intent—in fact, he has expressly
endorsed legislative history use when the statutory text is
247
ambiguous; so his low rates of legislative history citation could have
many causes, including a failure to locate on-point legislative history,
purpose, or intent in the cases he authored.
Second, although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts rarely
invoked the purposivist interpretive tools in the opinions they
authored, all of these Justices proved quite willing to join opinions
that dueled with opposing opinions over statutory purpose or
248
legislative history. This is consistent with Brudney and Ditslear’s
pointed finding that there was no “Scalia Effect” for opinions
249
authored by other conservative Justices. Thus, it is difficult to tell
whether Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts’s low rates of
legislative history and purpose reliance are caused by philosophical
objections—or by a lack of available legislative history, purpose, or
intent arguments in the cases in which they authored opinions, or by
some other factor.
Third, there is a difference between statements about statutory
meaning made by legislators in the legislative record, on the one
hand, and the objective statutory history that shows how a statute
246. See infra Table 9.
247. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
318−20 (2005).
248. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011); CSX Transp., Inc., v.
Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 301 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 225, 240–42 (2011); Bloate v. United States, 562 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2010);
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502, 525 n.5
(2009); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009); Powerex v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551
U.S. 224, 231 (2007); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 680 (2006).
249. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 32, at 169−70.
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evolved over time, through multiple drafts and amendments, on the
other. Although textualists object to the use of statements in the
legislative record, even the most ardent among them is willing to
consult evidence of how a particular statutory phrase or provision
250
evolved over time. The cases in my dataset were coded both for
references to statements in the legislative record and for references to
the evolution of the statute form of legislative history that textualists
favor. Thus, philosophical objections to legislative history use cannot
entirely explain textualist Justices’ low rates of reference, or dueling
over, this interpretive tool. Further, all of the Justices other than
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts—including conservative Justices
Alito and Kennedy—were willing to invoke statutory purpose and
legislative history in a sizeable number of the cases they authored,
which means that legislative history dueling was possible in all of the
opposing opinions authored by six of the nine Justices on the Court at
251
any given time.
Finally, it is possible to take a crude measure of what the
Justices’ dueling over legislative history, purpose, and intent might
look like without the skewing effect potentially created by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts—by examining the subset of cases in
252
which none of these Justices authored an opinion on either side.
When we adjust the dataset in this manner, the results are surprising,
and provide only mixed support for the “refusal to cite” hypothesis.
Most surprisingly, the rate of judicial dueling for legislative history
actually decreases, from 25.3 percent to 16.7 percent, when opinions
253
authored by these three Justices are removed! This means that the

250. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 702–03 (1995) (“[T]he historical
evolution of a statute—based on decisions by the entire Congress—should not be discounted for
the reasons that may undermine confidence in the significance of excerpts from congressional
debates and committee reports.”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2
(1992) (Scalia, J.) (comparing the enacted language of the Airline Deregulation Act with an
earlier version that passed the Senate); Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers &
Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“[L]egislative history of a bill is valuable only to the extent it shows genesis and
evolution . . . .”).
251. See infra Table 9.
252. Such a measure is overinclusive, excluding cases in which dueling may have occurred
between a majority and dissenting opinion authored by other Justices, but it provides at least a
crude control set of opinions for examining whether judicial dueling over purpose, legislative
history, and intent looks substantially different when the authors of both opposing opinions are
regular users of these interpretive tools.
253. There were only twenty-four cases in this reduced dataset in which at least one opinion
referenced legislative history (compared to seventy-six such cases when cases containing
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Court was actually more likely to duel over legislative history as an
interpretive resource in cases where Justices Scalia, Thomas, or
Roberts authored an opinion than in cases where they did not.
Indeed, of the nineteen dueling legislative history cases in the full
dataset, Justice Scalia authored one of the dueling opinions in five
254
cases, and Justice Thomas did so in another four. In other words,
although Justices Scalia and Thomas may not prefer to reference
legislative history of their own accord in the vast majority of opinions
they author, these Justices seem willing to counter an opposing
opinion’s legislative history references with competing references of
their own.
For purpose and intent, by contrast, when we eliminate opinions
authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts from the dataset,
the rates of judicial dueling increase, from 24.7 percent to 32.0
255
percent, and from 26.5 percent to 35.8 percent, respectively. These
latter rates do provide some crude evidence of a dampening effect on
dueling in opinions authored by these three Justices. However, even
with this adjustment, the rates of judicial dueling over purpose and
intent remain comparable to the rates of dueling over many
textualist-preferred tools—slightly higher than dictionary references
(28.6 percent), at roughly the same level as the other statutes tool
(34.5 percent), and below the rate for text/plain meaning rule (42.7
percent).
At bottom, the problem for textualism is that its claims about the
ubiquity and malleability of legislative history, statutory purpose, and
congressional intent have been so vigorous. In arguing that “there is
something for everyone” and invoking Judge Leventhal’s cocktail
party quip, textualists have implied that competing purposes,
congressional intent, and legislative history should be available—or
manufacturable—in most cases. Against that rubric, a dueling rate of
25 percent seems quite low, even if one accepts some dampening
effect based on Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s disinclination to
reference statutory purpose, intent, or the legislative record form of
legislative history in the opinions that they author. Relatedly,
textualists have made such strong claims about the ability of textopinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts are included). Of these, only four
involved dueling over legislative history, compared to nineteen dueling legislative history cases
in the full dataset.
254. See sources cited supra note 248.
255. For purpose, the no-Scalia-Thomas-Roberts dueling figure was seven of twenty-four
cases; for intent, it was five of fourteen cases.
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based interpretive tools to lead judges to one correct result that the
rough equivalency between the rates of dueling exhibited for these
256
interpretive tools and the purposivist tools is glaring.
In short, the dueling canon data suggest that textualism’s
underlying assumptions about different interpretive tools’ ability to
constrain judges may be incorrect. If textualism wants to push
interpreters to privilege text-based interpretive tools over tools such
as purpose and legislative history, then, it may need a different
theoretical rationale for this methodological prioritization. Perhaps
that rationale is the formalist Article I, Section 7 argument that only
the statutory text is law. Perhaps it is the landscape coherence idea
that individual statutes should be interpreted in a manner that is
257
consistent with the rest of the corpus juris. Textualism already relies
significantly on both of these justifications, so the lesson from the
dueling canons study may simply be that the judicial restraint
component of the textualist argument against legislative history and
258
related purposivist tools of construction has been called into doubt.
At the same time, the dueling canon data suggest that textualism
may be able to find a way to render its preferred interpretive tool—
the plain meaning rule—more constraining, or predictable. The
doctrinal analysis in Section II.C showed that much of the dueling
that occurs over the plain meaning rule involves one opinion that
follows the “prototypical meaning” of a statute, pitted against an
opposing opinion that employs a “legalist meaning” of the statute.
This observation raises the possibility that courts could eliminate at
least some judicial dueling that occurs over this interpretive tool by
choosing decisively between prototypical and legalist meaning—that
is, by declaring that plain meaning means the prototypical meaning,
not the legalist meaning, or vice-versa—and by dictating the kinds of
measures that jurists should look for when applying the plain meaning
rule going forward (for example, the core example the legislature was
256. Moreover, the dampening argument made regarding purposivist tools is matched on
the other end by dictionary definitions: Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens—who
are philosophically disinclined, though not opposed, to relying on dictionary definitions—all
exhibited very low overall reference rates for dictionary reliance. See infra Table 9. If one
accepts the argument that legislative history dueling would be higher if all Justices on the Court
were willing to use this interpretive tool, then one also must accept that dictionary dueling
would be higher if the liberal Justices were more willing to use this interpretive tool.
257. See SCALIA, supra note 27, at 17; Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 270−71.
258. Or further into doubt, as other empirical studies have shown that the plain meaning
rule does not constrain the Justices ideologically. See CROSS, supra note 50, at 176; Brudney &
Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 5, at 57−60.

KRISHNAKUMAR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

DUELING CANONS

2/2/2016 8:54 PM

989

seeking to cover or, conversely, the meaning given to a word or
259
phrase in other parts of the corpus juris). In other words, courts
could adopt a sort of binding, mini-methodological stare decisis
dictating how the plain meaning rule should be applied going
forward. The data from the Roberts Court’s first five-and-a-half terms
suggest that such a rule could reduce the frequency of plain meaning
dueling at least a little, and perhaps by as much as one-third.
B. Purposivism
Purposivism is an interpretive approach associated with the
260
Legal Process movement. In contrast to textualism, it advocates that
jurists interpret the words of a statute by identifying the statute’s
purpose and selecting the meaning that best effectuates that
261
purpose.
Purposive statutory interpretation typically involves
inquiries into legislative history, the societal problem that prompted
the legislature to enact the statute, legislative intent, and other
sources that might illuminate a statute’s objectives. It can entail
guesswork and judicial discretion, but is often defended on the
ground that reliance on legislative history and purpose helps restrict
262
judicial discretion and fulfill congressional intent.
Purposivism once was the dominant approach to statutory
interpretation, but over the past few decades it has come under
263
significant attack. The criticism has come from both the New
Textualism, which arose largely as a reaction to purposivism, and

259. Victoria Nourse, who along with Larry Solan, popularized the prototypical-legalist
meaning distinction, argues that statutory interpreters should seek a statute’s prototypical
meaning. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1000−04. For our purposes, it matters not which form of
plain meaning rule courts choose, so long as they choose one and stick with it.
260. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting the centrality of The Legal Process materials to purposebased views of statutory interpretation).
261. Id. at xcii.
262. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1548−49; Stevens, supra note 16, at 1−2.
263. See Roger Colinvaux, What Is Law? A Search For Legal Meaning And Good Judging
Under A Textualist Lens, 72 IND. L.J. 1133, 1139 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 334−35 (1990);
Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003–04
Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 574 (2005); Manning, supra note 231, at 2416−17; see also John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 103 (2006)
(questioning “whether the construct of imputed semantic meaning reflects a more defensible
conception of legislative supremacy than does the construct of imputed policy coherence”).
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from public choice theorists, who have criticized purposivism as
providing a rose-colored glasses view of the legislative process. Both
sets of critics have emphasized the open-endedness of the search for
statutory purpose and have argued that purpose-based interpretation
enables judges to import their personal policy preferences into the
264
statute.
This study’s dueling canon findings provide mostly good news for
purposivism. First and foremost, purposivism can celebrate that the
data show no evidence supporting textualism’s attack on purposivistpreferred tools of interpretation. Indeed, for purposivists, the
headline from the study should be that as interpretive tools, purpose,
legislative history, and intent appear no more susceptible to judicial
shaping to support competing interpretations than do textualistfavored tools such as the whole act rule, dictionary definitions, and
the plain meaning rule. Moreover, during the period studied, the
purposivist-interpretive tools were used to support competing
readings of the same statute in only one-fourth of the cases in which
265
they were invoked. These data came as quite a surprise because
most statutes have more than one motivating purpose and because
legislative history (particularly statements made on the House and
Senate floor) can cut in multiple directions—rendering these two
purposivist interpretive tools ripe for dueling use in opposing
opinions.
On the other hand, the data do not show any evidence
supporting purposivism’s affirmative claims that statutory purpose
and legislative history constrain judges or ensure that jurists give
statutes a meaning that is faithful to Congress’s intent. In fact, the
doctrinal analysis in the next section illuminates several ways in which
judges can disagree over how to characterize a statute’s purpose or
over what the legislative history means. Moreover, Tables 6a and 6b
demonstrate that when the Justices duel over statutory purpose and
legislative history, they do so in a manner that is highly ideological.
(The data for legislative intent are better, suggesting some

264. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 78, at 26−29 (commenting that the application of
statutory purpose is dependent on the perspective of the interpreter); Philip P. Frickey, From
the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 251 (1992); Adrien Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1885 (1998)
(criticizing the “malleability of purposive interpretation”).
265. See supra Table 1.
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constraining effect for Justices Ginsburg and Breyer). Thus, while
the frequency of judicial dueling over purpose, intent, and legislative
history might be relatively low, the manner in which the Justices duel
over these interpretive tools shows that there is substantial room for
disagreement in application—and that these tools seem incapable of
constraining judges to vote against their ideological preferences.
As with the plain meaning rule, however, the inside legislative
history doctrinal analysis suggests a way that this purposivist tool
might be made more determinate or predictable in application.
Specifically, most of the Roberts Court’s dueling over legislative
history involved a majority opinion that cited one form of legislative
history (e.g., a conference report) and a dissenting opinion that
referenced a different form of legislative history (e.g., a rejected
proposal). Thus, if courts were to adopt a binding hierarchy of
legislative history, dictating a precise order in which judges should
rely on specific forms of legislative history, at least some of the
dueling over this interpretive tool potentially could be diminished.
For example, the Supreme Court could adopt a rule that, say,
conference reports trump all other forms of legislative history,
followed by regular committee reports, statements by sponsors,
rejected proposals, and so on down the line. If the Court enforced
such a rule strictly, then the only forms of dueling over legislative
history that should occur are disagreements about which
interpretation a particular piece of legislative history favors and/or
competing inferences drawn from inconsistent statements in the same
piece of legislative history. This latter form of dueling was rare—
267
occurring in only six cases in the dataset. This suggests that a
binding hierarchy of legislative history sources could provide clarity
about which interpretation the legislative history points toward in a
particular case, enabling litigants and their attorneys to know where
to concentrate their resources when researching legislative history
and perhaps making legislative history use more predictable.
Significantly, an informal hierarchy of legislative history sources
268
does already exist. Committee reports, for example, are widely

266. See supra Table 6g.
267. See cases cited supra note 219.
268. See, e.g., OTTO J. HETZEL, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 2001); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 972 n.d
(providing an ordered list of legislative history materials from OTTO HETZEL, MICHAEL
LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed. 2001)). For a
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considered to be the most authoritative form of legislative history,
269
falling second only to conference reports. And empirical studies
have found that the majority of legislative history references made in
270
Supreme Court opinions are to committee reports. So adopting a
formal hierarchy of legislative history sources would not require a sea
change in the Court’s interpretive practices or even great debate
about the appropriate order of sources. What it would require is a
judicial precommitment to employ the most authoritative forms of
legislative history when they are available, and judicial discipline to
avoid invoking less authoritative forms when the latter contradict the
most authoritative forms. Of course, one cannot expect such a
hierarchy to eliminate all judicial dueling over legislative history—the
battleground could simply shift from competing forms of legislative
history to arguments over the relevance that a particular piece of the
271
legislative record bears for a particular interpretive question. But a
hierarchy could help to reduce the already low overall rate of dueling
over legislative history by creating greater consistency in at least some
cases. For example, where a conference committee report and a floor
statement directly conflict on the same question, a hierarchy of
sources would tell us which one ranks as more authoritative.
C. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is not a jurisprudential approach that claims to
ensure judicial constraint or to improve the predictability of statutory
interpretation. Rather, it posits only that judges should construe
statutes by focusing on the practical consequences that will result
from an interpretation and seeking the best result. There is no single
or uniform theory of pragmatism, but its various strands are united—

persuasive argument that the most relevant legislative history is that which corresponds to the
last decisionmaking point by Congress, see Nourse, supra note 149, at 98.
269. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Nw.
Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] congressional
conference report is recognized as the most reliable evidence of congressional intent because it
‘represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both houses.’” (quoting Dep’t of
Health & Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1986))).
270. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 299 (1982); Michael H.
Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice
Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 390 (1999); Krishnakumar, supra note 17, at 237.
271. For example, we often see different sources that address the interpretive question at
issue with varying degrees of precision, such that an on-point line of questioning from a hearing
arguably could trump, say, a vague or silent committee report.
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and distinct from textualism and purposivism—in their open emphasis
on outcomes and practical consequences and their frank recognition
that statutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by judges.
Judge Richard Posner, for example, has argued that the goal of
statutory interpretation should be to produce the best results for
272
society. Judge Posner defines pragmatism, at its core, as “a
disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on
273
conceptualisms, generalities, pieties, and slogans.” Bill Eskridge
similarly urges that statutory interpreters should take public values
into account and construe statutes dynamically—to reflect current
274
social, political, and legal contexts.
Notably, pragmatism shares much in common with legal realism,
which challenges the rule-bound formalist narrative and insists that
judges decide cases based significantly on social or practical
275
considerations. In fact, Llewellyn himself was a pragmatist, albeit
one who focused on disproving the formalist account as an impossible
ideal and providing a more accurate description of how judges
actually decide cases, rather than on articulating a normative theory
for how judges should decide cases.
It is perhaps fitting, then, that the dueling canon data provide
some descriptive support for pragmatism—and the legal realist
account. As Table 1 shows, the Justices on the Roberts Court dueled
over practical-consequences considerations slightly more often than
they dueled over most traditional canons and tools of statutory
construction—indeed, more often than they dueled over every other
276
interpretive tool save the plain meaning rule and other statutes.
Moreover, all of the Justices other than Justice Thomas referenced
practical consequences frequently in the statutory opinions they

272. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL & LEGAL THEORY
227 (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73−74 (1990).
273. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3 (2003).
274. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 260, at 321; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46 (1988) (“[S]tatutes ought to be
responsive to today’s world. They ought to be made to fit, as best they can, into the current legal
landscape.”).
275. See, e.g., E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM,
PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 4−6 (2005); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 193−94 (1988); Zipporah Batshaw
Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,
470–71 (1987).
276. See supra Table 1.
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277

authored, as Table 9 reports. Only the plain meaning rule and
Supreme Court precedent exhibited higher rates of dueling
consistently, across all Justices. In this sense, the data vindicate the
larger point made in Llewellyn’s article, that statutory cases are not
very different from common-law cases in their susceptibility to
judicial policymaking, despite the existence of neutral canons of
construction.
Table 9: Rates of Reliance on Interpretative Canons and Tools by
Opinion Author
Scalia
(n=68)

Thomas
(n=67)

Alito
(n=51)

Roberts
(n=38)

Supreme Court Precedent

36.8%

53.7%

41.2%

57.9%

Text or Plain Meaning Rule*

61.8%

64.2%

54.9%

50.0%

Dictionary Rule
Language Canons +
Whole Act Rule (Combined)

22.1%

26.9%

29.4%

15.8%

27.9%

44.1%

37.3%

55.3%

Other Statutes

25.0%

17.9%

33.3%

28.9%

Common Law

16.2%

9.0%

13.7%

18.4%

Substantive Canons

8.8%

11.9%

9.6%

21.1%

Whole Act Rule

25.0%

37.3%

31.4%

47.4%

Practical Consequences*

30.9%

17.9%

41.2%

31.6%

Purpose*

8.8%

14.9%

25.5%

13.2%

Intent*

2.9%

6.0%

15.7%

7.9%

Legislative History*

10.3%

9.0%

23.1%

13.2%

277. This is true even for those Justices who openly subscribe to other interpretive
approaches and even for textualists, who object in principle to pragmatic reasoning.
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Kennedy
(n=44)

Souter
(n=35)

Ginsburg
(n=46)

Breyer
(n=73)

Stevens
(n=60)

Supreme Court Precedent

61.4%

54.3%

47.8%

49.3%

55.0%

Text or Plain Meaning Rule*

50.0%

45.7%

30.4%

27.4%

43.3%

Dictionary Rule
Language Canons +
Whole Act Rule (Combined)

27.2%

17.1%

13.0%

15.1%

16.7%

29.5%

31.4%

30.4%

20.5%

25.0%

Other Statutes

22.7%

22.9%

23.9%

20.5%

16.7%

Common Law

4.5%

14.3%

6.5%

11.0%

16.7%

Substantive Canons

13.6%

11.4%

13.0%

8.2%

25.0%

Whole Act Rule

22.7%

31.4%

28.3%

19.2%

21.7%

Practical Consequences*

47.7%

31.4%

50.0%

42.5%

30.0%

Purpose*

47.7%

17.1%

34.8%

41.1%

30.0%

Intent*

6.8%

22.9%

21.7%

21.9%

41.7%

Legislative History*
22.7%
28.6%
32.6%
41.1%
38.3%
* Indicates that one-way ANOVA test, using Bonferroni multiple comparison test, reveals a
significant difference between rates of reliance by different Justices in the opinions they
authored at p<.05. (For Text / Plain Meaning p=.0016; Purpose p=.0001; for Intent p<.0001; and
for Legislative History p=.0001). For Substantive Canons, the differences in rates of reliance
approached significance at p=.0597.

What is perhaps most interesting about the Court’s practical
consequences dueling is that it occurs despite wide-spread concerns
about judicial policymaking. Federal judges tend to resist the idea of
making any kind of federal common law and their concerns are
heightened in the statutory context, where legislative supremacy
278
looms large. Given this, the fact that the Roberts Court Justices
openly dueled over practical consequences at a rate of 30.9 percent in
their statutory cases suggests that the Justices believe that explaining
an interpretation’s practical effects will persuade readers of the
interpretation’s correctness or, at the least, that countering an
opposing opinion’s characterization of the consequences that would
follow from an interpretation is necessary to persuade opinion
readers. Otherwise, it would have been safer for the Justices to avoid

278. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 788 (2014).
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mentioning that pragmatic considerations played any role in the
Court’s reasoning, for fear of being charged with judicial activism.
Finally, the doctrinal discovery of the Court’s administrabilityversus-policy-constancy dueling suggests that practical-consequencesbased reasoning may be less ad hoc than the conventional wisdom
suggests, and perhaps more predictable than pragmatists themselves
realize. We now know that the Justices tend to focus their practical
reasoning on concerns such as an interpretation’s likely effect on
judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing the interpretation,
the clarity and predictability of the rule the interpretation creates or,
conversely, on the fairness, arbitrariness, or consistency over time of
an interpretation. Moreover, we know that these two sets of concerns
sometimes point to different interpretations in the same case, and
that different Justices prioritize these two sets of concerns differently.
This understanding gives litigants a better sense of what to expect
from judicial construction and scholars a better sense of what
practical reasoning means in practice. It also opens the door to new
debates within pragmatism, suggesting that it may no longer be
enough for pragmatists to urge judges to choose the construction that
achieves the “best results”—but may now also require pragmatists to
provide more concrete accounts of what kinds of practical
consequences judges should concern themselves with, and which
consequences judges should seek to ensure or avoid when different
consequences point in conflicting directions.
D. Methodological Stare Decisis
Recent scholarly work has illuminated efforts by state courts and
state legislatures to dictate a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools
that courts must follow, in a prescribed order—what Abbe Gluck has
279
called “methodological stare decisis.” A good example is the
Oregon Supreme Court’s three-step interpretive framework, which
the state court adopted on its own initiative and followed
280
“religiously” for sixteen years. Oregon’s framework consisted of a
three-tier hierarchy of interpretive resources that required courts to
consult textual canons at step one, legislative history at step two if
and only if the textual canons proved inconclusive, and substantive

279. Gluck, supra note 19, at 1754.
280. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1145–47 (Or.
1993); Jack. L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of “Legislative Intent” and Its Implications for
Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REV. 47, 50 (1997).
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canons at step three, only as a last resort if both textual tools and
281
Proponents of
legislative history proved indeterminate.
methodological stare decisis have argued that this kind of binding
interpretive framework renders statutory interpretation more
predictable, promotes consensus, conserves litigant and judicial
282
resources, and make courts seem less results-oriented. Critics have
argued that federal courts cannot agree on an interpretive framework,
that diversity in interpretive methods improves the quality of
deliberation about statutory meaning, and that different interpretive
283
techniques may be appropriate for different courts. This Article
need not take sides in the debate over the normative value of
methodological stare decisis. Rather, it is possible to bracket the
question of the desirability of methodological consistency and focus
instead on what the dueling canon data might teach us about the
workability of methodological stare decisis in federal courts.
On the one hand, the dueling canon data provide some reason
for optimism regarding the feasibility of methodological stare decisis.
One significant concern about methodological stare decisis is that it
simply will not work in federal courts, particularly at the Supreme
Court level, where most interpretive questions are close and
individual canons hypothetically are more likely to point in multiple
directions. The Roberts Court’s low overall rates of judicial dueling
for most interpretive tools, however, contradict that gloomy
prediction, showing that even in cases involving close statutory
questions, the Justices did not tend to find multiple applications for
284
most interpretive tools most of the time. In so doing, the data
demonstrate that it is quite possible that if the Justices were able to
agree on a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools to use in a

281. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 859 P.2d at 1146.
282. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1885 (2008); Gluck, supra note 19, at 1767; Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2142 (2002).
283. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 443–44 (2012); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The
Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010).
284. See supra Table 1. Recall that most interpretive tools coded for showed dueling rates in
the range of 21.8–28.6 percent (whole act rule, dictionary definitions, common law, purpose,
intent, legislative history) or lower, at 10.9–13.3 percent (substantive canons and grammar
canons). Two other interpretive tools, practical consequences and other statutes showed rates of
dueling in slightly more than three out of ten cases that invoked these tools (30.9 percent and
34.5 percent, respectively). Only one interpretive tool—text/plain meaning—gave rise to judicial
dueling at even close to half of the cases that invoked the tool (42.7 percent).
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prescribed order, they could apply those tools in a nondueling
manner much of the time.
On the other hand, two aspects of the dueling canon data caution
against too much optimism about the prospects for methodological
stare decisis. First, despite the low rates of judicial dueling reported
for most interpretive tools, the Justices’ rates of dueling over the plain
meaning rule were rather high. This is significant because, as
Oregon’s framework illustrates, the plain meaning rule tends to place
high in the hierarchy of interpretive tools that courts prescribe when
285
they adopt some form of methodological stare decisis. Thus, the
dueling canon data suggest that the first interpretive tool in a
preordained interpretive regime might prove inconclusive and have to
be bypassed in many cases. Second, this Article’s doctrinal analysis
demonstrates that there are countless ways for interpreters to divide
over the application of a particular interpretive tool, and countless
ways for judges to invoke the same interpretive tool to reach different
286
results. Majority and dissenting opinions might focus on different
statutory words, invoke different subparts of the whole act rule, argue
about which subsection of a statute is relevant, disagree over whether
to follow a statute’s general versus its specific purpose, and so on.
These multiple avenues for conflicting application of the same
interpretive tool raise the possibility that even if the Justices could
agree on a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools—e.g., committing to
employ textual tools of interpretation before considering others—the
result might be much higher rates of dueling over textualist tools of
interpretation such as the whole act rule, dictionary definitions, and
other statutes, rather than more judicial consensus. The same danger
of heightened dueling exists for legislative history and other tools that
are included lower in the interpretive hierarchy, as these tools
become relevant when the textualist tools do not produce a clear
answer. That is, in the tough cases with significant stakes, the judicial
battleground might simply shift from disagreement over which tools
to privilege to whatever terrain the new methodological regime
requires—e.g., what the “prototypical meaning” of a particular word
is.
Conversely, we might see Justices in opposing opinions claiming
less often that statutory text or the whole act rule dictates an
opposing construction, and more likely to characterize these
285. See Gluck, supra note 19 at 1754.
286. For a doctrinal analysis and discussion, see supra Part III.
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interpretive tools as creating ambiguity—so that they legitimately can
bring in helpful legislative history or other interpretive tools
authorized at later steps. If either of these results ensues,
methodological stare decisis might not, in practice, work to ensure the
consensus, predictability, conservation of resources and the like in the
federal context that it seems to have achieved in state courts.
Nevertheless, this study’s findings might provide at least a
modest boost for methodological stare decisis. As noted earlier, many
of the doctrinal patterns identified within the Justices’ dueling over
individual interpretive tools—e.g., prototypical versus legalist
meaning, administrability versus policy-constancy-based practical
reasoning, different forms of legislative history—suggest small-scale
opportunities for courts to adopt binding methodological rules
governing the application of particular interpretive tools, in the name
of greater predictability and clarity. That is, courts need not adopt an
Oregon-like rigid hierarchy of interpretive tools but could, instead,
bind themselves to consult only certain forms of legislative history
(and to reject others or use them only if more authoritative forms are
not available) or to seek the prototypical rather than the legalist plain
meaning, or to privilege administrability-type practical concerns over
policy-constancy concerns. Even if such small-scale binding rules
could not ensure greater predictability or judicial restraint in highstakes cases, they might do so for more run-of-the-mill, low-stakes
cases.
CONCLUSION
More than sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn inflicted serious injury
upon the canons of construction, providing what many have regarded
as anecdotal “proof” that the canons are indeterminate, easily
manipulated facades used to give judicial decisionmaking a false aura
of objectivity. Textualists long have argued that Llewellyn’s critique
was grossly exaggerated and that, in fact, it is the purposivist tools of
construction that are indeterminate and easily manipulated by judges.
Purposivists have countered that their preferred interpretive tools
ensure fidelity to legislative intent, taking for granted that such tools
point toward only one statutory construction. No one has bothered to
test these relative claims empirically. This Article begins the effort to
do so, seeking to measure the extent to which jurists serving on the
nation’s high Court employ individual interpretive tools to reach
competing outcomes in the same case. The measure is imperfect, but
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it reveals a lot about how the Justices publicly defend their statutory
constructions. Ultimately, the data suggest that some of the central
claims made by textualism may be unfounded, and that pragmatism
may benefit from more granular attention to the specific forms of
practical reasoning the Court seems to employ, and to divide over.
Throughout, this Article’s aim has been to illuminate how the Court’s
actual practices align—or not—with the myths suggested both by
Llewellyn’s infamous list of canons and countercanons and by the
most prominent theories of statutory interpretation.
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APPENDIX: DUELING CANONS BY CASE
Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule;
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent;
11 = Practical Consequences.
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Case
Rapanos v. United States
(4–1–4)
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(5–4)
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen
(7–2)
Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
(5–4)
FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.
(5–4)
Boumediene v. Bush
(5–4)
Massachusetts v. EPA
(5–4)
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good
(5–4)
Bartlett v. Strickland
(5–4)
Harbison v. Bell
(5–2–2)
Zuni Public Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(5–4)
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.
(6–3)
Riley v. Kennedy
(7–2)
Ricci v. DeStefano
(5–4)
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp.
(6–2)
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy
(5–1–3)
Bloate v. United States
(7–2)
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC
(6–1–2)
Wyeth v. Levine
(5–2–3)
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule;
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent;
11 = Practical Consequences.
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Case
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
(5–4)
Marrama v.
Citizens Bank of Mass.
(5–4)
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. Publ. Util. Dist. No. 1
(5–2)
Woodford v. Ngo
(5–1–3)
United States v. Santos
(4–1–4)
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.
(5–4)
Brown v. Plata
(5–4)
Gomez-Perez v. Potter
(6–3)
Lopez v. Gonzales
(8–1)
United States v. Rodriquez
(6–3)
Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend
(5–4)
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.
Se. Alaska Conservation Council
(6–3)
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
(8–1)
Nken v. Holder
(7–2)
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v.
Regal-Beloit Corp.
(6–3)
Sykes v. United States
(5–1–3)
Carcieri v. Salazar
(6–3)
Graham Cty. Soil & Water
Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson
(7–2)
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy
(8–1)
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule;
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent;
11 = Practical Consequences.
Canons
Case
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defs. of Wildlife
(5–4)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council
(5–2–2)
Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc.
(7–2)
Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
(6–2–1)
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
(5–4)
Begay v. United States
(5–1–3)
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v.
Zurich Am. Ins.
(6–3)
Hall Street Assocs. v.
Mattel, Inc.
(6–3)
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A.
(6–2–2)
Conkright v. Frommert
(5–3)
CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Ala. Dep’t of Revenue
(7–2)
James v. United States
(5–4)
Gonzalez v. United States
(7–1–1)
Schindler Elevator Corp. v.
United States ex rel. Kirk
(5–3)
Sossamon v. Texas
(6–3)
Perdue v. Kenny
(5–4)
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown
(7–2)
United States v. Ressam
(6–2–1)
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Legend: 1 = Text; 2 = Dictionary; 3 = Language/Grammar/Whole Act Rule;
4 = Other Statutes; 5 = Purpose; 6 = Legislative History; 7 = Substantive
Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent;
11 = Practical Consequences.
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Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta
(5–3)
AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion
(5–4)
Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc.
(5–1–3)
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.
United States
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Vaden v. Discover Bank
(5–4)
Negusie v. Holder
(6–4–1)
Cullen v. Pinholster
(5–4)
Winkelman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist.
(7–2)
Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting
(5–3)
Dolan v. United States
(5–4)
Fowler v. United States
(6–1–2)
Dillon v. United States
(7–1)
Hamilton v. Lanning
(8–1)
Ransom v.
FIA Card Servs., N.A.
(8–1)
Osborn v. Haley
(7–2)
Glob. Crossing Telecomm., Inc.
v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc.
(7–2)
Ministry of Def. & Support for
the Armed Forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Elahi (II)
(6–3)
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Canons; 8 = Common Law; 9 = Intent; 10 = Supreme Court Precedent;
11 = Practical Consequences.
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Holder v.
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United States v. Hayes
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Lawrence v. Florida
(5–4)
Corley v. United States
(5–4)
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(7–2)
Bowles v. Russell
(5–4)
Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp.
(7–2)
Magwood v. Patterson
(5–4)
Greenlaw v. United States
(6–1–2)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.
(5–3)
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